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THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM OF THE NAFTA
AND AGRICULTURE
JAMES F. SMITH*
MARILYN WHITNEY**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The success of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)' depends on predictable cross border market access for
goods, services and investments. To secure this end, there must be

agreement on the basic rules and an effective system for interpreting these rules when their application is disputed. The primary
models for the NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) are

the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 This article
outlines the procedures of each. The DSM experience of the
CUSFTA and the GATT in agricultural and natural resource cases
is analyzed. Finally, the paper projects the implications of these
DSM models and experience for the NAFTA and agriculture.
Because governments are extensively involved in agriculture
and because that economic sector has significant political clout, it
is likely that any trade agreement will generate agricultural disputes.' Agricultural trade dispute resolution has often been a fail* Lecturer, School of Law, University of California at Davis. Fulbright Scholar in
Mexico in 1986-87 and in Uruguay in 1991.
** Assistant professor, Department of Agrucultural Economics, University of California
at Davis Department of Agricultural Economics.
Research assistance by Francois Larrivee, J.D. University of California at Davis, 1991.
Funding for this research was provided by the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural
Economics at the University of California.
1. On September 25, 1990, President Bush formally transmitted to congressional
leaders his notice of intention to negotiate a bilateral free trade pact with Mexico and
endorsed Canadian participation. Mexico: PresidentSends Formal Request to Congress to
Begin Free Trade Negotiations with Mexico, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1499 (Oct. 31, 1990).
Congress gave the President such authority in May 1991. InternationalAgreements: Swing
Supporters of NAFTA Talks Urge Agreement on Environmental Protection, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1621 (Nov. 6, 1991). Negotiation began in June 1991. International
Agreements: United States Hopes to Have Exchange of NAFTA Texts by Fall, Roh Says, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1113 (July 24, 1991).
2. The CUSFTA became effective on January 1, 1989. The GATT is a contract to
which its original 22 members adhered in 1947. It was the provisional agreement for the
stillborn International Trade Organization, which was rejected by the United States
Congress. The GAIT is governed by a Council of Representatives. It has hosted seven
rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) which have resulted in considerable tariff
reductions and nontariff barrier agreements (Tokyo Round). As of this writing, the GATT
Uruguay Round remains deadlocked, primarily over the United States-European
Community agricultural subsidies differences.
3. Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement in Agriculture Trade Matters: The Lesson of
the GATT Experience, in U.S.-CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE CHALLENGES, 145, 148149 (Kristen Allen and Katie MacMillian eds., 1987).
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ure because of the absence of agreement over substantive rules,
particularly with respect to subsidies. 4 The continuing deadlock
over agricultural subsidies in the Uruguay Round, the sensitivity of
the U.S. fruit and vegetables industry to Mexican imports, the vulnerability of Mexico's small grain producers to U.S. imports and
the relatively modest liberalization in agriculture in the CUSFTA
suggest that the NAFTA will liberalize agricultural trade over a
lengthy transitional period.' The NAFTA will evolve over time
and require considerable interpretation. The most likely short
term agricultural liberalization is tariffication (substitution of tariff
for nontariff barriers) and tariff reductions, either of which would
cause an increase in the demand for protection through unfair
trade practice laws.6 The success of the NAFTA will largely
depend on the efficacy and perceived qualities of its DSM, particularly with respect to agricultural disputes.
Mexican officials have expressed interest in having a DSM that
will contain at least the same advantages for Mexico as those
obtained by Canada in the CUSFTA.7 Yet the DSM of the
CUSFTA that Canada bargained for, namely binational panels for
4. Id. at 152; Thomas Reese Saylor, Resolving Agricultural Trade Disputes, in U.S.CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE CHALLANGES, 155, 157-58 (Kristen Allen and Katie
MacMillian eds., 1987); Debra P. Steiger, Candian-U.S.Agricultural Trade: A Proposalfor
Resolving Disputes, in U.S.-CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE CHALLENGES 161, 161-166

(Kristen Allen and Katie MacMillian eds., 1987).
5. It is likely that the NAFTA will protect U.S. import-sensitive crops such as tomatoes,
citrus products, artichokes, etc., according to House Agricultural Chair Kika de la Garza.
De La Garza to Work on Bill to Help Mexico With Environment, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA)
1572 (Oct. 30, 1991). Protection could include lengthy transition periods of tariff reductions
combined with emergency snap-back provisions (short term tariff restoration). CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, art. 702, 27 I.L.M. 383 (1988) (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter CUSFrA].
6. G. Lermer, The Dispute Resolution Mechanism in the Free Trade Agreement, in
CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 31-32 (1990). The author refers to antidumping (AD) or
countervailing duty (CVD) laws as "contingency trade laws." This term, like "administered
protection," carries a certain pejorative connotation suggesting the protectionist nature of
these measures which, for better or worse, have become an important ingredient of U.S.,
Canada and Mexican trade law. See Robert E. Hudec, An Approach to Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws, Cross Border Trade and Market Access, in BUILDING A
CANADIAN-AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA 113 (Feb. 3, 1989).
7. Terry Wu and Neil Longley, A US.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: US. Perspective,
J. WORLD TRADE, June 1991, at 5, 10. Mexico's Trade Secretariat's (SECOFI) Sixth
Monograph noted that "[c]onsidering that antidumping and anti-subsidy regulations can be
used to limit access to these markets, our country has insisted current systems be revised."
Government Study Outlines Mexico's Dumping Rules, Prospectsfor NAFTA, 8 Int'l Trade
Rptr. (BNA) 1548 (Oct. 23, 1991). Twenty-five U.S. AD/CVD actions were pending against
Mexico in 1988. See Julio J. Nogu~s, Los casos de aranceles compensatorios de Estados
Unidos en contra de M9xico (United States Countervailing Duty Cases against Mexico),
ESTUDIos ECONOMICOS, July-Dec. 1986, vol. 1, no. 2, at 337.; James F. Smith, Aspectos
jurdicos del GA TT y del comercio exteriorestadounidense,(Legal Aspects of the GATT and
U.S. Foreign Trade) 20 ESTADOS UNIDOS, PERSPECTIVA LATINOAMERICANA, CUADERNOS
SEMESTRALES 109 (1986). Well before negotiations began Mexico's ambassador Gustavo
Petricioli said that a free trade agreement between Mexico and the U.S. should include
provisions for dispute resolution similar to those in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
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antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases (Chapter
19),8 is merely a temporary provision. 9 The creation of special
AD/CVD procedures (binational panels) for Canada was a major
concession by the U.S. in that it provided a procedural exception
to its trade laws. To date, Canada has prevailed on seven of the
eleven panel decisions litigated on the merits under chapter 19.10
The U.S. may seek to narrow the AD/CVD DSM in the NAFTA.
Mexico is probably disposed to expand its use to other controversies. Canadian officials, like their Mexican counterparts, believe
that U.S. unfair trade practice laws are "administered protection"" with significant adverse economic consequences. 2 The
U.S. did not include a similar AD/CVD DSM in its initial NAFTA
DSM proposal. Mexico did. 3
The adoption by the NAFTA of an "institutional" DSM, like
the CUSFTA, (essentially an agreement to negotiate) appears certain (Chapter 18).'" The CUSFTA provision is modeled after the
Mexico: Mexico's AmbassadorSays FTA Should Include DisputeResolution ProvisionsLike
Canada FTA, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1479 (Sept. 26, 1990).
8. ADs offset "dumping," which GAT'T article VI defines as the practice "by which
products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another at less that the
normal value of the products." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI:I, 3
B.I.S.D. 12 (Text of agreement in force 1958) [hereinafter GATTI. CVDs offset "subsidies,"
defined by GATT art. XVI:1 to be "any form of income or price support, which operates
directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product into, its territory." Id. art. XVI, 3 B.I.S.D. 30.
9. The CUSFTA's most remarkable feature, the substitution of a binational panel for
judicial review of unfair trade practice decisions, is due to expire no later than January 1,
1996.
10. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Status Report (Jan. 1992), Binational Secretariat,
U.S. Section.
11. Canadian researchers reported an explosive increase in trade contingency
(AD/CVD) actions (three times as many ADs in 1984 as in 1980 and four times as many
CVDs). See Lermer, supra note 6, at 36-37.
12. Keith B. Ferguson, Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade
Agreement, 47 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 317, 349 (1989). "In 1986 more than $4 billion of
Canadian exports to the U.S. [3.1%] were affected by unfair trade laws," while $384 million
of U.S. exports (0.12%) suffered duty impositions under Canadian AD/CVD laws. Alan M.
Rugman and Samuel D. Porteous, Canadianand U.S. Unfair Trade Laws: A Comparisonof
Their Legal and Administrative Structures, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 67, 73-74
(1990). The percentage of all U.S. AD/CVD actions which have been filed against Canada
and Mexico have been proportionate to their share of imports. The vast majority of such
actions were antidumping in the case of Canada and countervailing duty in the case of
Mexico. J. Michael Finger and Tracy Murray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States
Example, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1990, at 39, 43-45.
13. For a summary of the DSM negotiation positions as of February 21, 1992, see infra
note 14.
14. On March 23, 1992, El Financiero,a Mexican financial newspaper, published a
summary of the NAFTA "Dallas Composite" text resulting from the negotiation session
between the parties which took place during the week of Feb. 17, 1992 in Dallas, Texas.
TLC. Predominan las Diferencias, EL FINANCIERO, Mar. 23, 1992, at 1. See also Serra
Puche Tells Mexican Senate NAFTA May Get Extended Tariff Period, U.S.-MEx. FREE
TRADE REP., Apr. 20, 1992, at 1. The text was provided to El Financiero by Mexican
opponents of the NAFTA. The 500 page heavily bracketed text (Dallas Composite) includes
a chapter entitled "Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures."
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DSM of the GATT. It provides a familiar framework for GATT
members (consultation, negotiation, consensual referral to arbitration). The circumstances of the negotiation, namely the political
pressure to produce a highly complex agreement rapidly, 15 suggest an open-ended DSM to address unresolved and difficult
issues.1 6 For example, the politically volatile environmental proDallas Composite, Dispute Settlement, Feb. 21, 1992, U.S.-Mex., arts. 2301-2324
[hereinafter Dallas Composite]. The Dallas Composite is neither a complete proposal nor
an agreement; rather, it is an effort to set forth in one document the various negotiating
positions taken by the parties. If there is to be a NAFTA, it may well ultimately reject all or
any part of the Dallas Composite. Its provisions are summarized here to indicate the
tentative agreements and differences of the parties as of Feb. 21, 1992.
All parties agreed to establish a Trade Commission which, like the CUSFTA's
institutional commission, would be "composed of representative of each Party" wherein the
"principal representative shall be the cabinet/level officer or Minister primarily responsible
for international trade." Id. art. 2301(2). The commission has broad responsibility to
"resolve disputes that may arise over its interpretation or application of the NAFTA." Id.
art. 2301(1), (3). The Commission may "delegate responsibilities to, ad hoc or standing
committees .. . [legal, scientific or other] (CDA MEX) expert groups." Id. arts. 2301(4),
2318. (The U.S. was not in agreement with the bracketed language). Canada dissented
from the proposition that "[All decisions of the Commission shall be taken by consensus.]"
Id. art. 2301(5).
The Commission is to establish a "Secretariat comprising national Sections," and each
party is to "establish a permanent, office of its national section" bearing the "cost of its
Section." Id. art. 2302(2), (3). "The Secretaries of the disputing Parties shall act jointly to
service all meetings of panels established pursuant to this Agreement." Id. art. 2302(4).
There was general support for administrative tribunals in each country to review and
correct final administrative action "relating to matters covered by this Agreement." Id. art.
2306(1). There was agreement to "provide appropriate mechanisms for the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate" "as a means of settling commercial disputes." Id. art. XXXX.
Mexico proposed a separate Chapter 11 for "Review of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Amendments Determinations." Id. art. 2308. This Chapter 11 was
not included in the Dallas Composite. Like CUSFTA's Chapter 18, the agreement provides
for the following DSM: notification, article 2304, consultation, which if unsuccessful would
be followed by referral to the Commission, article 2311, whereupon the Commission could
opt for input from technical advisors, expert groups, working parties, good offices,
conciliation, mediation, etc. article 2312. Id. arts. 2304, 2311, 2312. The dispute may then
be referred to "a panel of experts," article 2313, or to "binding arbitration," article 2323.
Id. arts. 2313, 2323. (The parties have not agreed as to what disputes if any would be
automatically referred to binding arbitration.) Disputes arising under both the NAFTA and
the GATT "may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party or
Parties, according to the rules of that forum." Id. art. 2309.
Each party is to maintain a roster of panelists, and the panels are to consist of five
members. But, there was no agreement on panel-member qualifications or panel
composition. Id. arts. 2314, 2315. Nor was there consensus as to what the panel would
address in their initial report beyond findings of fact. Id. art. 2320.
"Upon receipt of the final report, the disputing parties shall agree on the resolution of
the dispute, which normally shall conform with the recommendation of the panel." Id. art.
2322(1). Preferred resolutions are non-implementation or removal of a measure causing
nullification or impairment, compensation, or a withdrawal of benefits of equivalent effect.
Id. arts. 2322(2), (4), (5). "Nullification and impairment" is broadly defined as "any benefit
reasonably expected to occur . . .directly or indirectly" under the Agreement. Id. art.
2404(1).
15. The pendency of elections in the U.S. in 1992 and in Canada in 1993, the lingering
recession in both countries and the political opposition made the NAFTA more urgent (to
boost investment and trade growth) but also delayed the NAFTA in order to avoid the high
political cost of the perceived downside of the NAFTA for some sectors in an
election/recession year.
16. "It is well known in diplomacy that those who draft agreements often postpone the
most insoluble problems for those who must administer the agreements in the future."
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as "unfair trade practices"
tection and labor issues may be defined
17
and thereby included in a DSM.

In order to analyze the possible modifications of the
CUSFA's DSM for the NAFTA, it is first necessary to describe its

two distinct procedures. These procedures are: (1) dispute resolutions of any question of interpretation or application of the agree-

ment except financial services or AD/CVD cases (Chapter 18); and
(2) AD/CVD matters disputes (Chapter 19).
II.

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CANADA-UNITED
STATES TRADE COMMISSION (CHAPTER 18)

1. Chapter 18 applies to all disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the CUSFTA, including actual or proposed modifications of either party's trade laws, except the
financial services (Chapter 17) and unfair trade practice (Chapter
19) provisions.' 8

2. The Canada-United States Trade Commission (Commission) is established to supervise implementation of the agreement,

resolve disputes and to oversee the CUSFTA's further elaboration.' 9 The Commission is to be composed of representatives of
both parties by a cabinet level officer or Minister responsible for
international trade or his or her designee.2 ° Decisions are to be by

consensus." The dispute panel process may be initiated only by
the federal governments.2 2
3. The parties recognize their obligations under the GATT.
The complaining party must elect either forum for dispute
Ingrid Nordgren, The GA 7'PanelsDuring the UruguayRound: A Joker in the Negotiating
Game, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 87, 87 & n.1 (1991) (quoting GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION

(1986)).

17. In a letter to Congress dated May 1, 1991, President Bush insisted that labor and
environmental protection not be part of the NAFTA but pledged to address these concerns
in parallel agreements (May action plan). In October, 74 House Democrats, two-thirds of
whom voted for fast-track authority, sent a letter to President Bush, stating that there is a
"'general consensus" that the U.S.-Mexico Border Plan is wholly inadequate. International
Agreements: Swing Supporters of NAFTA Talks Urge Agreement on Environmental
Protection, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1621 (Nov. 6, 1991). Fast track authority passed by a
margin of 231 to 192 in the House and 59 to 36 in the Senate. Keith Bradsher, Senate Vote
Backs Bush on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1991, § 1, at 35. The U.S. Council for
International Business has endorsed an environmental DSM for the NAFTA, parallel to the
trade related DSM. InternationalAgreements: U.S. Business Group EndorsesProvisionfor
FTA Environmental Dispute Settlement, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1823 (Dec. 11, 1991).
18. CUSFTA art. 1801(1).
19. Id. art. 1802(1).
20. Id. art. 1802(2).
21. Id. art. 1802(5).
22. Id. art. 1805 (neither provincial nor state governments have input).
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resolution.23
4. Each party is to provide notice of any proposed or actual
measure that may materially affect the operation of the CUSFTA
along with any requested pertinent information. 4
5. A party may request consultations with the other party on
any matter affecting the CUSFTA.2 5 If bilateral consultations fail
to resolve the matter within thirty days, the complaining party
may have it referred to the Commission.2 6
6. The Commission must refer safeguard (emergency) disputes to binding arbitration.
Otherwise it may (by consensus)
decide the matter itself or refer it to third-party mediation or
binding arbitration. 8 If it retains the matter, either party may
request that an advisory binational panel of experts be established
to make nonbinding recommendations.2 9
7. Binational panelists are to be selected from rosters maintained by the Commission and submitted by each party. Each
party selects two panelists and those four select the fifth. 0
8. The parties have the right to at least one hearing before
the panel, with the right to submit written arguments. 3a There is
a limit of 241 days for resolution of the dispute.3 2
9. If the losing party fails to implement the findings of a
binding arbitration panel and the parties are not otherwise agreed
on a remedy, the prevailing party may suspend application of
equivalent benefits under the agreement until compliance is
achieved.33
10. Expert panels may make nonbinding recommendations
after the parties have had an opportunity to comment on its preliminary findings. If the Commission is unable to reach an agree23. Id. art. 1801(2). The NAFTA, Dallas Composite, includes a similar provision. See
Dallas Composite, supra note 14, art. 2309.
24. CUSFTA art. 1803(1), (3).
25. Id. art. 1804(1).
26. Id. art. 1805(1).
27. Id. art. 1806(lXa). CUSFTA's Chapter 11, the emergency action (safeguard)
provision, permits temporary duty increases in response to surges in imports that are a
"substantial cause of serious injury" to domestic producers. Id. art. 1101(lXb). Although
Canada is rarely a source of "surging" imports, its imports have been "sideswiped" by
emergency actions aimed at others. Gary N. Horlick et al., Dispute Resolution Mechanisms,
in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT, 65, 72-

73 (Jeffrey J. Schott and Murray G. Smith, eds., 1988); Lermer, supra note 6, at 38.
28. CUSFTA arts. 1805(2), 1806.1(b).
29. Id. art. 1807(2).
30. Id. art. 1807(3).
31. Id. art. 1807(4).
32. JUDITH H. BELLO & ALAN

F.

HOMER, GUIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA

AGREEMENT 762 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
33. CUSFTA art. 1806(3).

FREE TRADE
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ment within thirty days of the panel's report, the prevailing party
may suspend equivalent benefits until an agreement is reached. 4
A.

CUSFTA's CHAPTER 18 AND THE GAT DSM

The Dallas Composite of the NAFTA retains very similar features to those found in CUSFTA Chapter 18.3 5 While Chapter 18
is modeled on the DSM of the GATT, it contains the important
innovations of a roster of panelists agreed upon in advance, 36 time
limits and the provisions for binding arbitration. Despite its auspicious title, the Commission 3 7 has no permanent institutional presence.3 8 It is a political body committed to mediation and
nonbinding arbitration (except in safeguard disputes).
The Commission has had few cases to resolve in its short existence. But the GATT DSM, upon which it is modeled, has
unsteadily evolved from a negotiation process to an adjudicatory
one since its inception in 1947. The GAT DSM3 9 may be invoked
for failure to carry out the obligations of the agreement or other
circumstances which nullify or impair its benefits.4 ° If the GAIT

Council (operating by consensus) finds the nullification or impairment "serious enough to justify such action," it may allow appropriate withdrawal of concessions. But this is rarely done. 4 1 An
34. Id. art. 1807(6)49).
35. See Dallas Composite, supra note 14.
36. Panel selection has often caused considerable delay in the GATT DSM in that
disputants may bicker for years over its composition.
37. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
38. The U.S. has traditionally shied away from ceding any jurisdiction on international
trade disputes to a truly independent DSM. Robert H. Hudec, Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, Comments, in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra

note 27, at 91, 96. The proposed Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO)
contained an adjudicatory DSM with provision for a permanent Executive Board,
arbitration and referral to the International Court of Justice. These permanent DSM
features did not survive in the GATT following the U.S. Congress' rejection of the ITO.
Robert P. Parker, Dispute Settlement in the GATT and the Canada-US. Free Trade
Agreement, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1989, at 83, 84-86; ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT'
LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 52 (2d ed., 1990).

39. While the GATT itself contains some 30 DSMs and the Tokyo Round elaborated an
additional eleven, the primary DSM appears in articles XXII and XXIII. The DSM is first
invoked by the complaining party asking for consultations. If consultations fail to resolve
the matter, the complaining party may have the matter referred to the GATT Council. The
Council must then appoint a panel to make recommendations, first to the disputants and
then to the Council.
40. A prima facie case of nullification or impairment is presented by a showing of
violation of the GATT, quantitative restriction or when a domestic subsidy is introduced or
increased on a product in which a tariff concession has been negotiated. JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 167, 331-32 (1979). The procedural rules of the
GATT DSM have been codified in the "Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance" (the 1979 Understanding), and its
Annex. GATT, 26th Supp., B.I.S.D. 210 (1980).
41. Only one dispute, the 1953 complaint of the Netherlands against the U.S. quotas on
the importation of dairy products, has resulted in the authorization of suspension of
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emphasis on consultation, numerous opportunities for procedural
delays, a requirement of consensus and an absence of effective
implementation remedies of the GATT DSM have traditionally
encouraged negotiated or political solutions rather than rule adjudication 42 (the application of substantive rules to the facts of the
dispute).
The creation of the European Community (EC) was in violation of the GATT .43 By the 1960s, the EC's resistance to rule-adjudication forced the GATT Council to take the pragmatic approach
of diplomacy over legalisms." The U.S. and many developing
countries have since pressed for a more legalistic approach by
presenting numerous cases and arguing for reforming the procedures.4 5 Since the Uruguay Round began in 1986, the GATT's
DSM has been unusually active.4 6 Important procedural reforms
were adopted in the 1988 Midterm Review of the Uruguay Round
concessions. The Netherlands was permitted to limit its imports of wheat from the U.S.
JOHN H. JACKSON

&

WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS 352 (2d ed. 1986). In the "Chicken Wars" case, a GATT "arbitration" panel was
formed in 1960 to evaluate the loss caused by a violatory import levy by the Germans. The
withdrawal of equivalent concessions was authorized. The U.S. did so by raising duties on
brandy and trucks. In the meantime, Volkswagon had began production in the U.S. and
benefited by these duties that raised the prices on Japanese trucks. The losers were the
Japanese truck exporters and the American consumers, not the German chicken industry.
See Herman Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Chicken War: A Postscript,5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 317-18 (1974).
42. Such "negotiation" has been characterized as "power-oriented," as opposed to
"rule-oriented" diplomacy, which favors the larger, wealthier and more powerful economy.
John H. Jackson, Perspective on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and
Benefits of Legal Protection in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1571-72 (1984).
Or as Professor Robert E. Hudec has written, "it is usually the smaller and weaker partner
in any deal that wants and needs the protection of effective legal remedies against
violations by the other." Robert H. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Comments, in
THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 27, at 87.
43. See HUDEC, supra note 38, at 212. The European Community (EC) or Common
Market, resulted from the merger of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
(1951), the European Economic Community (EEC) (1957) and the European Atomic
Energy Commission (Euratom) (1957). The EC includes Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Greece, Portugal and Spain. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 199. The term the "EC"
is used herein to refer to the 12-country trading block created by these treaties and the
merger of these treaty systems.
44. See HUDEC, supra note 38, at 212. Japan, like the EC, has been inclined to view the
GATI as a framework for negotiations. Parker, supra note 38, at 89. But in 1984, the EC
adopted a regulation authorizing the EEC Commission, at times on the basis of individual
or firm petition, to launch a GATT DSM and to follow it through to its conclusion before
contemplated counter actions could be utilized. While somewhat parallel to the U.S.
Section 301 procedures, it is distinct. For a discussion of the U.S. Section 301 procedures,
see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 69-74 (1990).
45. HUDEC, supra note 38, at 251-53. The U.S. has pressed for a more rule-oriented
approach, proposing quicker decisions, elimination of the consensus requirement, binding
arbitration, etc. See generally Ferguson,supra note 12, at 340-49. See also Review of the
Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement Under the GATT and the Tokyo Round
Agreements, USITC Pub. 1793, Inv. No. 332-212, at 23-27 (Dec. 1985).
46. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, US. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16:
Settling Disputes in the GAT. The Past,Present and Future, 24 INT'L LAWYER 519, 519
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at Montreal.4 7 The round has also generated the 1990 draft (Brussels) and the 1991 "Dunkel Text," which call for automatic panel
establishment, panel and appellate report adoption, and authorization of retaliatory implementation by the Council, unless there is a
negative consensus against such establishment, adoption or implementation. Optional referral to binding arbitration and the establishment of a permanent appellate review body were also
proposed. Also, time limits for implementation of panel reports
are to be set.48 If these reforms are adopted, the GAIT DSM will
become a more effective rule-adjudication mechanism. 49 The
U.S., the EC and Japan have agreed in principle to these reforms.
The CUSFTA Commission, which is modeled on the GATT,
may experience a similar metamorphosis. It is somewhat of a
hybrid (negotiation/adjudication). Several of its features suggest a
pure negotiation model. Binding arbitration is required only in
safeguard cases. 5 ° Like the GATT's dispute settlement procedure,
the CUSFTA's DSM is vague and includes nonviolational "nullification and impairment" of benefits, 1 which suggests political
negotiation. However, the CUSFTA's DSM is not as well equipped
as the GATT's for rule-adjudication. It lacks the institutional pres(1990). Nineteen panels were established and presented their reports from October 1986
to November 1990. Nordgren, supra note 16, at 87.
47. These reforms tighten time limits, expedite panel selection, standardize terms of
reference and improve surveillance of implementation of panel reports. GATTAdopts New
Dispute Settlement Procedures,Country-Review System, GATT Focus, June 1989, at 1.
48. Understandingon the Interpretationand Application ofArticles XXII and XXIII of
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFT FINAL AcT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, at

287-306,

MTN.TNC/W/35 Rev. 1 (Dec. 3, 1990). See generally Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Under Articles XXII and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFr FINAL AcT EMBODYING THE RESULTS
OF THE

URUGUAY

ROUND

OF MULTILATERAL

TRADE

NEGOTIATIONS,

at

S.1-S.23,

MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) (Dunkel Text).
49. In the first 40 years of GATT, 170 legal complaints were filed-93 progressed to
litigation, 72 led to rulings and 20 were settled. All but nine of the 72 were resolved by final
ruling or settlement. Richard Bilder, The Canada-US. Free Trade Agreement: New
Directions in Dispute Settlement, 1989 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251, 262. During the
Uruguay Round (1986-90) as well as the Tokyo Round (1970-75), the U.S. Administration
initiated numerous GATT panel actions in order to convince a skeptical Congress that the
system could produce effective decisions. The recent effort was more successful in that 16
of 19 panel reports were adopted during the Uruguay Round, all but three within two to
three months after presentation to the council. Nordgren, supra note 16, at 97. Only 3 of
13 reached a "panel decision of sorts" during the period 1970-75. HUDEC, supra, note 38, at
251-52.
50. See CUSFTA, art. 1807(8) (providing that the Commission shall agree to resolution
of disputes following nonbinding arbitration).
51. A CUSFTA concept borrowed directly from GAIT art. XXIII.1. See CUSFTA art.
1801(1). The CUSFTA DSM also addresses benefits anticipated under this agreement and
provides that the Commission's decisions "normally shall conform to the recommendations
of the panel." Id. art. 1807(8)-(9). The Dallas Composite NAFTA draft has borrowed
identical language. See Dallas Composite, supra note 14, art. 2404.1.
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ence and external force of the GATT Council. 2 In addition, it
lacks the invaluable support of a permanent professional staff like
the independent GATT Secretariat.53
The provision of binding arbitration in the CUSFTA is backed
by the right to suspend the application of "equivalent benefits."
Such implementation compares favorably to any existing trade
agreement of the U.S., including the GATT and the Israel-United
States Free Trade Agreement.54 However, the CUSFTA's binding
arbitration awards are not binding on the national courts as in the
case of the judgments of the EC's Court of Justice.55 Neither party
to the CUSFTA has contemplated the kind of political and institutional integration reflected in the EC's parliament and the jurisdiction of its Court of Justice.56 Professor Hudec has contrasted the
U.S. rule-oriented GATT reform position with the rather conservative implementation features of the CUSFTA DSM as follows: "It's
fine to make GATT adjudication work better at producing legal
decisions, but let's not get too carried away with enforcing them,
57
OK?"

B.

AGRICULTURAL DISPUTES IN THE

GATT

Agriculture has been the subject of more trade disputes than
any other sector within the GATr. 5' The resolution of these dis52. The GATT Council is composed of representatives of the Contracting Parties
"willing to accept the responsibility of membership." KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 338 (1970). "Membership of the Council
is open to all countries who wish to be represented." GERARD CUVZON, MULTILATERAL

COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS
IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES 40 (1965).
53. Bilder has described the Secretariat as follows:

Typically, the Secretariat provides a staff of two officials, a legal officer, and a
specialist in the subject area of the complaint. The Secretariat staff guides
parties and panelists through the hearing procedures, does the panel's research,
drafts the statement of facts and arguments, is present when the panel discusses

the merits in camera, and usually drafts the panel's findings and conclusions. It
has been said that GATT dispute settlement could work without expert panelists,
but not without Secretariat staff.
Bilder, supra note 49, at 259. The Dallas Composite NAFTA draft appears to offer little
hope for a significant Secretariat in that it is composed of national sections, each of which is
to be separately funded by its sponsoring government. Moreover, each party contemplates
separate administrative tribunals to review and correct final administrative actions relating
to the Agreement. See Dallas Composite, supra note 14, arts. 2302, 2306(1).
54. Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement, April 22, 1985, art. 19.1 nonbinding
DSM, 24 I.L.M. 654.
55. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 199-219.
56. The EC is a common market which explicitly requires a common external tariff.
See generally GATT art. XXIV. The NAFTA, like the CUSFTA, is a trade agreement.
57. Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Comments, in THE CANADAUNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 27, at 91, 93-94.
58. Approximately 45% involved agricultural products. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 41, at 345.
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putes has been problematic because agriculture is significantly

exempt from the trade discipline of the GATT. 59 During the Uruguay Round it seemed that the U.S. was purposely testing the effi-

cacy of the DSM, and mostly in agricultural cases. 60 Thirteen of
the nineteen panels, during the latest Uruguay Round, dealt with
agriculture. The U.S. won a series of cases against quantitative
restrictions 61 including the Canadian restrictions on yogurt and ice

cream. 62 The U.S. was able to defend its own quota provisions for
sugar and sugar products in a case brought by the EC, but was
unsuccessful against a similar Australian complaint. 3

The U.S. challenge of EC production subsidies to soybeans and
oilseeds as discriminatory and violative of the national treatment
and as measures which nullified and impaired earlier EC tariff con-

cessions resulted in a favorable panel recommendation.6 4

59. The "national treatment" clause itself specifically exempts domestic subsidies.
GATT art. 111:8(b), 3 B.I.S.D. 9. The quota prohibition permits marketing orders and import
quotas, if necessary, to enforce domestic production or surplus removal programs. Id. art.
XI:2(b), 3 B.I.S.D. 19-20. International commodity agreements establishing quotas are
permitted. Id. art. XX(h), (i), 3 B.I.S.D. 43-44. The restriction on export subsidies to
primary products is unenforceable because it is ambiguously conditioned on the receipt of
"more than an equitable share of world export trade." Id. art. XVI:3, 3 B.I.S.D. 31.
Domestic subsidies are restricted only if they cause "serious prejudice to the interests" of a
GATT party in which case consultations are required. Id. art. XVII, 3 B.I.S.D. 30. In 1955,
the U.S. obtained an agricultural products waiver from the national treatment and quota
restriction, thereby allowing import quotas which other parties may not impose. JACKSON
& DAVEY, supra note 41, at 956-59. This waiver alone seriously undermines the GATT's
significance in agriculture. Tariff concessions in agriculture have not been as numerous, nor
as meaningful as for other products. Id.
60. Descriptions of these cases can be found in Nordgren, supra note 16, at 87-102;
Bello & Holmer, supra note 46, at 532; Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 41st
Report, USITC Pub. 2317 (Sept. 1989); Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 42nd
Report, USITC Pub. 2403 (July 1991).
61. Japanese quantitative restrictions against U.S. dairy products, processed vegetables
and fruit, preserved bovine meat and starch were found violative of GAT' article XI:2 (cXi)
and not subject to the exception of an existing government program to restrict domestic
production. Nordgren, supra note 16, at 88. The U.S. then successfully invoked panels
against the quantitative restrictions of the Nordic countries (apples and pears), the EC
(apples), Korea (beef) and Thailand (cigarettes). Id. at 89-90. Korea's effort to justify the
restrictions as necessary for balance of payment as provided by GATT article XVIII:B was
rejected, as the proper steps had not been taken. Id. Thailand's argument that cigarettes
were "like products" to tobacco and therefore subject to its domestic production controls
pursuant to GAT'T article XI:2 (cXi) was rejected. Id. at 90-91.
62. Canada's effort to justify such restrictions as part of their domestic production
controls on raw milk was rejected on the grounds that such products were not "like
product" directly competitive with raw milk, etc., within the meaning of GATT article
XI:2(c). Id. at 90.
63. In the U.S., restrictions on the importation of sugar and sugar-containing products
applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the headnote to the schedule of tariff
concessions. Complaint by Australia on the Sugar Import Regime, Operation of the Trade
Agreements Programs 41st Report, USITC Pub. 2317, at 46 & n.248 (Sept. 1989); U.
Accepts Ruling on Sugar Quotas, GATT Focus, July 1989, at 2.
64. Although the panel was set up in June 1988, the Report was not presented until
January 1989. GA 7T Council Resolves US-EC Soyabean Dispute, GAIT Focus, Feb. 1990,
at 3. The EC has yet to comply. The latest deadline for implementation expired on
October 31, 1991. GA 7T. US. Warns EC on Failure to Implement Oilseeds Ruling, 8 Int'l
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Japanese import levies on wine and alcoholic beverages were

found violative of article III.6 The GATT Council's adoption of
sixteen of nineteen cases during the Uruguay Round demonstrated
the effectiveness of the GATT's Midterm Review DSM reforms,
which included automatic establishment of a panel, standard
terms of reference and settled procedures for selection of panels.
C.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE CASES
UNDER CUSFTA CHAPTER 18 AND THE GATT.

To date, two disputes have been settled under the Chapter 18
provisions of the CUSFTA, Canada's Landing Requirement for
6 7 While both
Salmon and Herring6 6 and Lobsters from Canada.

cases concern fishery regulations rather than agricultural trade,
they have ramifications for agriculture, as do other environmental
and natural resource cases investigated under the GATT DSM.
Linkages between agriculture and the environment are an issue in
the NAFTA negotiations. For instance, the U.S. Congress has

expressed concern over differences between U.S. and Mexican
pesticide and pollution control regulations and enforcement. 6 A
brief overview of several environmental and natural resource
cases under the GATT and CUSFTA DSMs highlights issues relevant to the NAFTA negotiations.
Prior to 1989, Canadian regulations prohibited the exporta-

tion of unprocessed herring and sockeye and pink salmon from its
West Coast fisheries.69 Following a U.S. complaint, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled in November 1987 that these regulations constituted quantitative restrictions on exports inconsistent
with Article XI:1 of the GATT.7 ° Canada had argued that by
allowing an accurate monitoring of the harvest, the export prohibiTrade Rep. (BNA) 1656 (Nov. 13, 1991). But the U.S. has not been innocent of such delays.
In the superfund oil import levy case, the GAT Council adopted the panel report in June
1987 but the U.S. failed to implement it until November, 1989. See Nordgren, supra note
16, at 92.
65. Nordgren, supra note 16, at 91-92.
66. In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 ITRD 1026
(U.S.-Canada Binational Panel Final Report No. COA-89-1807-01, Oct. 16, 1989).
67. Lobsters from Canada, 12 ITRD 1653 (U.S.-Canada Binational Panel No. USA 891807-01, May 25, 1990).
68. InternationalAgreements: Swing Supportersof NAFTA Talks Urge Agreement on
Environmental Protection,8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1621 (Nov. 6, 1991).
69. Section 6 of the Pacific Commercial Salmon Fishery Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 823,
§ 24(1) of the Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations, SOR/84-324; pursuant to Canadian
Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1985) (Can.) as amended.
70. For a more detailed discussion of U.S.-Canadian disputes over salmon and herring
fisheries, see Ted L. McDorman, Using the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade
Agreement: The West Coast Salmon and Herring Problem, 4 CAN.-U.S. Bus. L. REV. 177,
177-89 (1990).
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tions served a valid conservation purpose and thus were a permitted exception to XI:I under XX(g). 7 '
Responding to the negative GATT decision, Canada revoked
its ban on unprocessed exports in late 1989 and instituted new regulations requiring one hundred percent domestic landing of West
Coast salmon and herring caught in Canadian waters. 72 The landing requirements applied not only to herring and sockeye and
pink salmon, but were extended to include chinook, coho and
chum salmon. Under these regulations, direct shipment of
unprocessed salmon and herring to U.S. processors was prohibited.
However, fish could be shipped unprocessed to the U.S. after first
being off-loaded in Canada for counting and collection of biological samples.
In challenging the landing requirements, the U.S. became the
first to utilize the Chapter 18 nonbinding arbitration provisions of
the CUSFTA. 7 1 A panel of two trade and two fisheries experts was
convened, with the Chair being qualified in both areas. The U.S.
viewpoint was that by necessitating extra handling of fish for
export but not of the domestic catch, the regulations had the clear
effect of restricting trade in violation of GATT XI: 1 and thus of
Article 407 of the CUSFTA, which incorporates said article. Canada's position was that the landing restrictions applied equally to
domestic and exported product and that Article XI: 1 was therefore
inapplicable. Further, even if found to be inconsistent with Article XI:I, the measures were an essential component of Canada's
resource conservation regime and thus a permitted exception
under Article XX(g). The panel agreed with the U.S. position, finding that the one-hundred percent landing requirements were a
restraint on exports and were not intended primarily as a conservation measure, since alternative measures could have allowed
adequate data collection. The panel further suggested that a more
limited landing restriction could be acceptable under the
71. GATT art. XX(g) (permitting, under certain conditions, the adoption or
enforcement of measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption"). As an exception to GAIT article XI:I, the burden of proof is on the
country adopting the measure to show that its primary purpose is conservation and that
there are no measures less disruptive of trade that might satisfy the same goal.
72. In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 ITRD 1026,
1028 & n.6 (Oct. 16, 1989) (citing Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations, amendment,
SOR/89-217, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 123, No. 10, 2384-84; Pacific Commercial Salmon
Fishery Regulations, amendment, SOR/89-219, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 123, No. 10,
2390-91).
73. A perceived weakness of the GAIT panel process is that a complainant cannot
force another state to form a panel. In contrast, the U.S. or Canada can require the
establishment of a panel under the CUSFrA. McDorman, supra note 70, at 181 n.14.
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CUSFTA. After four months of negotiation, the Commission
reached a consensus. Canada was allowed to maintain its landing
requirement in return for exempting twenty percent of the
salmon and herring catch and making these available to the U.S.,
with the exempt amount to increase to twenty-five percent in
1991-93.
In Lobstersfrom Canada,a CUSFTA Binational Panel considered whether a December 1989 amendment to the "Magnuson
Act ' 7 4 constituted a restraint of trade as alleged by Canada. This
amendment made it unlawful to transport or sell in the U.S. any
lobsters that were below a minimum possession size, egg-bearing,
or visibly stripped of eggs. The U.S. presented evidence that certain regions of the Atlantic lobster fishery were under extreme
fishing pressure and that, as a result, only one to six percent of
lobsters were reaching reproductive maturity in these areas.
Scientists expressed fear of a population collapse. Prior to enactment of the disputed amendment, possession of undersized lobsters harvested in U.S. waters had been prohibited, although small
Canadian lobsters could be imported if accompanied by documentation of their Canadian origin. The U.S. argued that a total ban on
undersized lobsters was necessary in order to prevent mingling of
small lobsters taken illegally from U.S. waters with those imported
from Canada. In a split 3-2 decision, the panel found that the U.S.
minimum size requirements on live lobsters sold in the U.S. were
not in conflict with Article 407.71 The majority of panelists agreed
that Article III, rather than Article XI:1, applied in this case, since
the size limitations on U.S. and Canadian lobsters were identical.
Two panelists dissented, stating that under this interpretation,
imports of virtually any product could be restricted simply by
imposing like restrictions on domestic goods. They acknowledged,
however, that even under Article XI:1, the measure might qualify
as a legitimate conservation measure under Article XX(g).
Perhaps the most controversial North American case involving environmental protection or natural resource conservation has
been the ongoing Mexican-U.S. dispute over yellowfin tuna harvesting methods. This species of tuna congregates beneath schools
of dolphin. Tuna fishing vessels encircle dolphin schools with
purse seine nets in order to harvest the associated tuna, killing and
74. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1XJ)
(1988).
75. See Lobsters from Canada,12 ITRD 1653 (U.S.-Canada Binational Panel No. USA
89-1807-01, May 25, 1990).
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injuring dolphins in the process. As a signatory to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), the U.S. requires its fish-

ing vessels to use special precautions to reduce dolphin mortality
and limits total dolphin deaths for the U.S. fleet to 20,500 per
year.7 6 The MMPA also requires that the U.S. prohibit importation of yellowfin tuna products from nations whose "average kill
per set" of dolphins exceeds 1.25 the average U.S. kill per set during the same period.

Beginning in September 1990, the U.S. banned the importation of yellowfish tuna and products thereof, after finding that
Mexico had exceeded the incidental kill standards of the MMPA.
Additionally, an "intermediary nations" embargo prohibited the
importation of tuna products originating from the Mexican fleet,
even if shipped through or processed in an intermediary nation.
In response, Mexico filed a complaint against the U.S. under the
GATT DSM with respect to the primary embargo, the intermediary nations embargo, the potential imposition of import prohibitions under the "Pelly Amendment," and the tuna product

labeling provisions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Informa77
tion Act (DPCIA).

As in Lobsters from Canada, the U.S. position was that the
restrictions on incidental taking of dolphin applied equally to

domestic and Mexican vessels and thus were subject to Article III
rather than Article XI of the GATT. However the GATT sided
with Mexico in condemning both the primary and intermediary

embargoes. The panel found that because the embargoed species
(tuna) is not the subject of the conservation policies (dolphin), the
embargo did not fall under article III.78 Since the area in which
76. GATE" Implications on Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) (testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General Counsel,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative), [hereinafter GATT Hearing].
77. Id. at 20-22 (testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative). The "Pelly Amendment" can be found at Section 8(a) of the
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988). Mr. Charat, Vice-President of
the Mexican Fisheries Association, notes that the actual dolphin kill rate for the Mexican
Fleet may have been proportionately less than the U.S. fleet but, nonetheless, triggered the
law. The GATT Panel found the measure discriminatory. Felipe Charat, Mexico: No
Threat to Dolphins,J. CoM., Nov. 5, 1991, at 34.
78. See Scott Otteman, Findings of GA 77Dispute Panelon US. Tuna Ban, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE SPECIAL REPORT, Sept. 6, 1991, at S2-S8; GAT Hearings, supra note 76, at 17-18
(testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
A previous attempt by the U.S. to ban tuna from Canada pursuant to the Magnuson Fishery
and Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), Pub. L. No. 94-265 (1975), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801-1882 (1988) (prohibiting fish imports from foreign states that claim jurisdiction of
tuna within 200 miles of their shores), was likewise condemned by a GATT panel. United
States-Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT, 29th
Supp., B.I.S.D. 91, 105-09 (1983). The federal courts enjoined the U.S. from importing tuna
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the disputed fishing practices are employed lies outside U.S. territorial waters, Articles XX(b) and XX(g), excepting from Article XI

those measures necessary for protection of animal life or natural
resource conservation, were not applicable. Furthermore, even if
Articles XX(b) and (g) could be applied extrajurisdictionally they

would not be available in this case, since the "maximum kill per
set" standard was capricious. Mexican vessels could not determine

until after the tuna harvest whether a violation of the standard had
occurred.7" Nor had the U.S. exhausted other GATT-compatible
avenues for dolphin protection, such as negotiation of interna-

tional agreements.8 0
The GATT dolphin decision raises many substantive questions."' It appears, in light of this case, that a number of major U.S.
environmental laws and international conventions to which the
U.S. is party could also be found GATT-inconsistent. 2 Others fear
and tuna products from Mexico as well as from countries that have processed such tuna for
export to the United States. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1991).
79. While denouncing the GATT"panel's decision on Mexican tuna, Greenpeace, in a
recent position paper, noted that the comparability provision of the MMPA imposes "a
double standard that not only does not discourage dolphin encirclement, but may actually
encourage

the

practice."

GREENPEACE,

DOLPHINS,

TUNA

AND

FREE

TRADE:

A

GREENPEACE PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (1992). Greenpeace advocates amending the MMPA by
"banning encirclement and prohibiting any tuna caught by boats that set on dolphins from
entering the U.S. market," while striving for an international ban on encirclement. Id. at 6.
80. Under provisions of the DPCIA, tuna harvested under certain criteria may be
labeled "dolphin safe." The Panel found that these labeling provisions did not discriminate
between countries and were GATT-consistent. Also, although the "Pelly Amendment"
could be imposed in a GATT-inconsistent manner, it was not in effect in this case, and it
does not mandate GATT-inconsistent measures. See GATT Hearings, supra note 76, at 21
(testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
The Panel suggested a GATT-consistent approach would be to impose an excise tax on all
tuna sold in the U.S. that was not caught in a dolphin-safe way. David Palmeter, Supporting
Dolphins and GATT, J. CoM., Oct. 1, 1991, at 39.
81. Among the GAT's shortcomings, as cited by environmental and consumer
interests, are its failure to address externalities such as pollution; its placing of the burden of
proof on consumer and environmental groups under articles XX(b) and XX(g); and the
possibility of over-representation of business relative to consumer interests.
To some extent, these criticisms reflect the GATT's origin at a time when
environmental concerns were not widely held. Steven Shrybman, from the Canadian
Environmental Law Association, testified before the House Subcommittee and noted that
the word "environment" does not appear in the GATT. GAT' Hearings, supra note 76, at
94 n.48 (testimony of Steven Shrybman, Canadian Environmental Law Ass'n). See also
Proposed Negotiation of A Free Trade Agreement with Mexico: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 226, 227
(1991) (statement of Steven Shrybman, Canadian Environmental Law Ass'n). In its
concluding remarks, the GATT dolphin Panel suggested that adoption of its report would
not affect the rights of nations to act jointly in enacting measures in conflict with current
GAT' rules. GAT! Hearings, supra note 76, at 19 (testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General
Counsel, Office of the U.S.Trade Representative). The Panel also recommended that the
matter of extrajurisdictional efforts to conserve resources would better be addressed by
amending or supplementing the GATT rather than by reinterpreting existing articles XX(b)
and (g). Id. at 21-22 (testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative).
82. In addition to the Pelly Amendment, Magnuson Act, and the MMPA, a partial
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that the GATT and other trade agreements may undermine legiti-

mate health and safety regulations by labelling them as "non-tariff
barriers to trade,"8' 3 or might require nations to import goods manufactured using prison or child labor. Because of the enormous

political impact of such concerns, the U.S. and Mexico have agreed
that Mexico would not ask the GATT Council to adopt the panel's
recommendations. Rather, this controversy is to be resolved
within the NAFTA negotiations. Until there is greater international agreement on the relationship between environmental
measures and trade restrictions, it is likely that such controversies
will continue to be negotiated, as opposed to adjudicated, on a
bilateral basis.
In contrast to the ongoing controversy involving the relation-

ship between trade and environmental laws, the choice of a DSM
(GATT versus CUSFrA) in Chapter 18 cases appears (from the
limited evidence at hand) to have had little impact on the deci-

sions rendered. Chapter 18 Panels have relied extensively on
GATT precedent in interpreting GATT articles. Thus, a DSM similar to the Chapter 18 DSM of the CUSFTA may be acceptable to

all parties to the NAFTA, all of whom are members of the GATT?.
III.

BINATIONAL PANEL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN

ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
CASES (CHAPTER 19)

Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA includes three important innovative DSM features for AD/CVD disputes:
1. Elaboration of new laws. The parties have pledged to

develop a new system of AD and CVDs within five to seven years.
If this does not occur, either party may terminate the agreelisting of other U.S. environmental laws which environmental groups fear may be found
GATr-incompatible include the Endangered Species Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151q (1988); African
Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4212 (1988); Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (foreign notification provisions), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (foreign notification provisions), 42 U.S.C. § 6901
(1988); Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C § 701 (1988); and the Forest Resources Conservation and
Shortage Relief Act, 16 U.S.C. § 620 (1988).
International environmental treaties and conventions to which U.S. is a party and
which might be GATT-inconsistent include the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species; Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer; International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling; Migratory Bird Treaty; and the Cartagena Caribbean
Convention. GAT'T Hearings, supra note 76, at 49 (statement of David Phillips, Earth
Island Institute, on behalf of a coalition of the Environment Organizations; Ralph Nader,
Consumer Advocate; and Steven Shrybman, Canadian Environmental Law Assoc.).
83. GAT Hearings, supra note 76, at 2 (opening statement of the Honorable Henry A.
Waxman).
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ment.8 4 In the meantime, the parties may apply their own laws. 5
2. Replacement of Judicial Review by Binational Panels.
Either country, or the party otherwise entitled to judicial review
of final AD and CVD determinations, may obtain review by a binational panel.8 6 Panels are to use the substantive law8 7 and stan-

dard of judicial review which would otherwise apply in the
importing country. 8 Panel decisions are binding on both parties
and the relevant agencies in each country.8 9 If the importing
party's law has been improperly applied, the panel is to remand
the final determination to the administrative agency for action not
inconsistent with its decision.90 The panels are ad hoc, with a new
one struck for each case.
Panels are to be composed of five members, a majority of
whom are lawyers, chosen by the parties from a roster developed
by them.9" Chapter 19 panels are independent of the institutional
panels (Chapter 18), and a permanent secretariat is established to
facilitate their operation.9 2 Panel decisions may be subject to
"extraordinary challenge" by either party which will be heard by a
committee of three judges or former judges. Such challenges are
limited to a member's gross misconduct, bias or serious conflict of
interest, to cases in which the "panel seriously departed from a
fundamental rule of procedure," or to cases in which the panel has
exceeded its jurisdiction.93
3. Modification of AD or CVD laws. Although the parties
may effect changes in their existing AD or CVD laws,94 such modifications will only apply to the other country if it is named in the
legislation, 95 has received prior written notification, 96 and, if con84. CUSFTA art. 1906.
85. Id. art. 1902(1).
86. Id. art. 1904(5). The U.S. implementing legislation provides that a timely request
for judicial review may be made by a person not having standing. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(gX8XA)

(1988).

87. CUSFTA art. 1904(2).
88. Id. art. 1904(3).
89. Id. art. 1904(9).
90. Id. art. 1904(8).
91. Id. annex 1901.2(1), (2), (3). A party need not select its own nationals and may
exercise four peremptory challenges of the other party's selections. If panelists are not
selected within allotted times, they must by chosen by lot. Id.
92. See id. art. 1909.
93. Id. art. 1904(13). This extraordinary challenge provision has been used one time.
See Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada, 13 ITRD 1859, 1860 (Extraordinary
Challenge Committee No. USA 89-1904-06, June 14, 1991) (summarily rejecting the
challenge because the "allegations do not meet the threshold for an extraordinary challenge
that is set forth in article 1904.13").
94. CUSFTA art. 1902(2).
95. Id. art. 1902(2Xa).
96. Id. art. 1902(2Xb).
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sultations have been extended, where requested. 97 Changes must
be consistent with the GATT', the Antidumping Code" and the
Subsidies Code 99 of the GATT; the object and purpose of the
CUSETA; and must not overturn panel decisions. 100 If consultations do not resolve disputes, the affected party may request a
binding binational panel review.' 0 ' If the panel recommends
changes in the legislation which are not effected and the parties do
not otherwise agree, the complainant may enact similar legislation
02
or terminate the agreement.1

Chapter 19 establishes important improvements over existing
DSMs for AD/CVD procedures in each country. It provides
impartial, binding and rapid rule-adjudication.'0 3 Some Canadian
administrative decisions that were not previously subject to judicial review, such as final determinations of dumping or subsidies
by the Department of National Revenue, Customs and Excise
(DNR), are now subject to binational panel review. 10 4 In the U.S.,
binational panels of five experts will replace the individual judge
of the Court of International Trade. These judges from the Court
of International Trade have sometimes issued conflicting opinions.
However, losing parties may now rely on their governments to initiate and plead its case before a binational panel, thereby substantially reducing their costs.' 0 5
The U.S. Congress has been asked to amend trade legislation
in response to administrative rulings unfavorable to U.S. industry
97. Id. art. 1902(2Xc).
98. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (Antidumping Code), pt. I, Jan. 1, 1980, 26 GATT B.I.S.D. 171.
99. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies Code), Jan. 1, 1980, 26 GATT B.I.S.D.
56 (1980).
100. CUSFrA arts. 1902.2(dXi), 1903(lXb).
101. Id. arts. 1903(1), 1903(3Xb).
102. Id. art. 1903(3Xb).
103. Id. arts. 1904, 1908. The panel is mandated to decide the appeal within 300 to
315 days from the date of the final determination. Id. art. 1904(14). Neither GATT article
XXIII nor the GATT Antidumping Code establishes deadlines for establishing a panel and
obtaining a final ruling. GATT art. XXIII; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, article 15, GAT I, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 171
(1980). The GATT Subsidies Code does attempt to do so. Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
art. 18, GATT, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 36, 76-77 (1980). Appeals to the United States Court of
International Trade have taken at least a year, and at times two to three years, and this is
after the administrative process. An exporter may have to pay provisional duties during
this entire period. Delays in Canada were comparable. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 328.
104. CUSFTA art. 1904(15). For a definition of "final determination," see CUSFTA art.
1911.
105. Canadian litigants in U.S. proceedings have paid $4 million in legal fees in 1983 in
the softwood dispute, $1 millon each in the swine and fish, actions, and millions more in the
softwood dispute in 1986. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 329.
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and, on occasion, has done so. 1"6 The CUSFTA requires notice and
consultation prior to any future legislative changes. It further
establishes binational panels to analyze the effect of proposed legislation with respect to unfair trade practices (AD/CVD). If the
modification of the legislation recommended by the binational
panel is not complied with, the complaining party may respond in
kind or terminate the agreement. Retaliation is limited to comparable legislative or executive action, unlike the GATT, where
7
retaliation may widen the dispute into other areas.10
A. CUSFTA CHAPTER 19 CASES
Two Chapter 19 Binational Panel decisions involving agricultural products have been completed to date: Red Raspberries and
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork. These cases allow a preliminary
assessment of the CUSFTA DSM's impact on settlement of AD and
CVD disputes and suggest the potential of a similar DSM under
the NAFTA.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979108 shifted the administration of U.S. trade laws from the Treasury Department to the
Department of Commerce and created a bifurcated system for
resolving trade disputes. Under this system, the International
Trade Administration (ITA) determines whether "less than fair
pricing" (in AD cases) or subsidization (in CVD cases) has
occurred, while the International Trade Commission (ITC) tests
for material injury or threat of material injury. ITA and ITC decisions were formerly reviewed by the Court of International Trade
(CIT), but they may now be heard by a CUSFTA binational panel.
Canada's Antidumping Act of 1970109 was superseded by the
Special Import Measures Act of 1984.110 Under the latter, charges
of dumping are initially investigated by the Canadian DNR. The
106. Following a negative determination in the softwood lumber case, several bills
were introduced to expressly include natural resource pricing practices as countervailable
subsidies. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 333. In the Chilled Pork case, the U.S. industry
persuaded Congress to add the concept of "upstream subsidy" to U.S. trade law after an
International Trade Administration ruling that swine subsidies were not attributable to
pork products. See Fresh Chilled and Frozen Pork, 12 ITRD 2299, 2306-07 (Binational
Panel No. USA 89-1904-06, Sept. 28, 1990). Later, a GATIl Panel found the upstream
subsidy provision to be violative of the GATT. See Canadian Complaint on US.
Countervailing Duties on Imports of Pork Products, Operations of the Trade Agreements
Program, 42nd Report, USITC Pub. 2403, at 48 (July 1991); Canada/United States: U.S.
Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, GATT Focus, Oct.
1990, at 4.
107. Horlick et al., supra note 27, at 75.
108. Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (approved July 26, 1979).
109. Antidumping Act, R.S.C., ch. A-15 (1970) (Can.).
110. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985) (Can.).
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DNR Deputy Minister determines whether dumping has occurred
and if there is evidence of material injury. If allegations of dumping are confirmed, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
(CITT) determines whether injury has occurred, or will occur, and
whether such injury is caused by the dumped imports. Unlike the
U.S. ITC, the Tribunal may also consider consumer welfare after
making the initial determination, thereby choosing to forego or
reduce any duty not deemed to be in the public interest.1 1 1
Prior to the CUSFTA, a number of AD and CVD cases
between the U.S. and Canada had involved agriculture; affected
products included Canadian and U.S. potatoes,' 1 2 Canadian cut
flowers," 3 Canadian live swine and pork, 1 4 and U.S. corn." 5 A
perception existed that the escalation in AD and CVD actions constituted "administered protection"" ' and that the ITA, ITC and
CIT and their Canadian counterparts had, in some cases, exhibited
a protectionistic bias, applying incorrect economic reasoning in
arriving at their decisions. When examining the record for evidence of such bias, it is important to note that trade laws containing elements inconsistent with basic economic principles are by no
means uncommon." 7 Clearly, any DSM cannot be expected to
111. See Canadian Beef: Grading Changes Seen Affecting Trade, MONTHLY
IMPORT/BUS. REV., Oct. 1991, at 15. See generally Public Interest, Grain Corn, Report of
the Canadian Import Tribunal under Section 45 of the Special Import Measures Tax,
CANADIAN IMPORT TRIBUNAL, Oct. 20, 1987, at 3; Fred Lazar, Antidumping Rules
following the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1989, at
45, 58-59.
112. Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1463 (Dec.
1983).
For a discussion of the "Potato War," see Colin Carter et. al., The Potato War and US.Canada Agricultural Trade, in CANADIAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE, 125-141 (1990).
113. Fresh-Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel,
Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, and Peru, 11 ITRD 1493 (USITC Inv.Nos. 303-TA-18, 701-TA275-278, 731-TA-327--333, Pub. 2119, Aug. 1988).
114. Live Swine and Pork from Canada, 11 ITRD 1231 (USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-224,
Pub. 2108, Aug. 1988).
115. Subsidized Grain Corn Originating in or Exported from the United States of
America, Inquiry No. CIT-7-86 (March 1987) (finding of the Canadian Import Tribunal);
Canada: Trade Tribunal to ConsiderExtension of Countervail on Subsidized US. Corn, 8
Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1110 (July 24, 1991).
116. Alan M. Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on US.Administered Protection and
the Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REV. 305, 311 (1988).
117. For instance, consumers have virtually no standing under U.S. trade law, although
economic theory suggests that they are primary beneficiaries of free trade. Although
Canadian consumers recently gained a voice in trade disputes under Section 45 of the
Special Import Measures Act, Rugman and Anderson suggest that the measure is
insufficient to ensure adequate representation of consumers' interests. Alan M. Rugman &
Andrew Anderson, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms' Cases in the Canada-UnitedStates
Free Trade Agreement: An Economic Evaluation,24 CEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. AND ECON. 1,
41 (1990). Other inconsistencies with economic principles include: a lack of emphasis on
causality in CVD cases (see Era van Duren, Is There a Legal Opportunityfor an Economic
Analysis of Causality Under US. CountervailingDuty Laws?, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 8796 (1991); Lazar, supra note 111, at 54 (vagueness in both U.S. and Canadian definitions of
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correct deficiencies inherent in the laws on which it must base its
decisions. However, the CUSFTA has the potential to alleviate
protectionistic biases in several ways. First, a bilateral or multilateral panel of experts may tend to interpret the law more objectively than would a national court or tribunal. Second, by
mandating a strict timeline for dispute settlement, the CUSFTA
may make the appeals process faster and less costly and thus more
accessible. And importantly, under Chapter 19 the U.S. and Canada have agreed to develop new AD and CVD laws to replace
existing national laws.
Red Raspberriesfrom Canada 1 was the first case to be heard
by a binational panel under Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA. The dispute originated in 1984 when U.S. raspberry producers charged
Canadian producers with dumping bulk frozen raspberries in the
U.S. market. The ITA found positive dumping margins for several
producers. In its preliminary determination, the ITC cited declining U.S. capacity and increasing Canadian exports as evidence that
a threat of injury existed. Antidumping duties were imposed in
1985.
As required by the Tariff Act, an administrative review was
conducted in each year following imposition of duties to determine whether such duties should be modified or discontinued. In
conducting its second administrative review, the ITA departed
from its earlier procedure for calculating dumping margins.
Because home country and third market sales were few in
number, the ITA used constructed value rather than home market
sales to measure Foreign Market Value (FMV), and dumping margins were found to have increased. Canadian raspberry producers
appealed under Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA, noting that the ITA
material injury)); the use of accounting rather than economic costs; lack of consideration of
market structure in the importing and exporting countries (Susan Hutton and Michael
Trebilcock, An Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian Anti-Dumping Laws: A
Search for Normative Rationales, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990, at 123-46); unsupported
assumptions regarding subsidy pass-through (see Selected Issues In Trade Agreements
Activities in 1990, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 42nd Report, USITC 2403,
at 7 (July 7, 1991) (discussing the Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Porkfrom Canada decisions)); and
contradictory guidelines to be used in testing for dumping (Andrew Schmitz et al.,
Agricultural Export Dumping: The Case of Mexican Winter Vegetables in the US. Market,
63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 545-54 (Nov. 1981)).
Although a law may itself be free of protectionistic bias, it can be invoked to harass
foreign competitors even when the ultimate outcome is likely to be negative. J.M. Finger,
The Industry Country Incidence of "Less than Fair Value" Cases in US Import Trade, 21 Q.
REv. ECON. & Bus. 260, 264-65 (1981). The threat of possible trade disruptions and legal
costs may suffice to discourage foreign firms from competing.
118. In re Red Raspberries from Canada, 12 ITRD 1259 (Binational Panel No. USA-891904-01, Dec. 15, 1989), following remand, 12 ITRD 1652 (Binational Panel No. USA-891904-01, April 2, 1990).
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did not dispute that the existing home market sales were bona fide
and above the cost of production.
In relying on constructed value, the ITA had apparently violated its own Antidumping Duty Regulations for determining
FMV in such cases. Sales to the home market exceeded five percent of third country sales in terms of value and number (for two
firms) and exceeded five percent of total sales in number although
not in volume. The Panel remanded the case to the ITA, citing
the ITA's failure to explain why Canadian producers' home country sales had been disregarded.1 19 The ITA responded that home
country sales failed to exceed five percent U.S. sales by volume;
120
however the Panel rejected this argument as "legally deficient.' 1
On second remand, the ITA used home market sales as the basis
for computing
dumping margins, resulting in removal of duties on
12
two firms. '
The case of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Porkfrom Canada 122 was
reviewed under Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA beginning in 1990, at
the request of two Canadian meat packers, the Canadian Pork and
Meat Councils and the governments of Alberta and Quebec. In
1989 the U.S. ITA had found that a number of Canadian agricultural programs provided countervailable subsidies to pork producers, 123 while the ITC had determined that the U.S. pork industry
24
was materially injured or threatened with material injury.'
Binational Panels were formed to review each decision.
Major issues raised by the complainants regarding the ITA
decision included: (1) Whether subsidies received by hog producers are direct or upstream subsidies to pork producers;
(2) whether it is reasonable to assign the entire value of subsidies
to swine producers to fresh, chilled and frozen pork processors
when a significant quantity of other commercial products (ham,
bacon, sausage) are derived from the hog carcass; and (3) whether
seven of the subsidy programs deemed countervailable are, in fact,
generally available and thus not countervailable.
119. Red Raspberries, 12 ITRD at 1266.
120. Red Raspberries, 12 ITRD at 1652-53.
121. See In re Red Raspberries from Canada, 1990 WL 299942 (Binational Panel No.
USA-90-1904-01, May 2, 1990).
122. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 12 ITRD 1380 (USITC Inv. No. 701TA-298, Sept. 1989),following remand to ITC, 12 ITRD 2119 (Binational Panel No. USA-891904-11, Aug. 24, 1990), following remand, 13 ITRD 1024 (USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-298,
Oct. 23, 1990), following remand, 13 ITRD 1291 (Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-1 1,
Jan. 22, 1991).
123. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork From Canada, 12 ITRD 2299, 2302 (Binational
Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, Sept. 28, 1990).
124. Id.
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In regard to the first point, the Panel affirmed that subsidies to

hog growers may be considered direct subsidies to pork producers
under the "upstream subsidies" provision of the Tariff Act,1 25 noting, however, that this measure was GAT-inconsistent. 126 On the
second point, the Panel agreed with complainants that hog subsidies should be allocated by weight over all of the commercial
products resulting from hogs. And on the third point, the Panel

affirmed the countervailability of two subsidy programs and
requested a remand on the remaining five on the grounds that
substantial evidence of the "general availability" of such programs
was lacking.

1 27

The Panel's review of the ITC decision investigated the extent
to which the finding of threat of injury had resulted from (1) misleading data on pork production and consumption, (2) unsubstantiated conclusions regarding Canada's likely future market
penetration in Japan, and (3) unsubstantiated assumptions about
hog supply response to Canadian subsidy programs. In the ITC's
decision, a majority of the Commissioners had predicted that Canada's share of the U.S. market would rise to an injurious level, even
though it had recently been declining. This prediction was based
in part on data indicating a thirty-one percent increase in Canadian fresh pork production, declining U.S. pork consumption, evidence that Canada's shipments to Japan were declining, and the
notion that Canadian subsidy programs would induce a large supply response from hog growers. The Panel found that the data
indicating thirty-one percent Canadian production growth had
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1 (1988).
126. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 2299, 2304-11, Binational
Panel No. USA-89-1904-06 (Sept. 28, 1990). On remand the ITA affirmed the
countervailability of three of these five subsidy programs, finding substantial evidence in
the record to support its decision, while finding a lack of substantial evidence to support its
countervailable subsidy determination against the other two. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Pork from Canada, Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990 WL 299940, at *1-8 (Dec. 7,
1990). In a second remand decision, the Panel affirmed the countervailability of one of the
three programs, but again remanded the other two for lack of, and inconsistency with the
substantial evidence in the record. In re Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada,
Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1991 WL 112791, at *1-2 (Mar. 8, 1991). In its final
redetermination, the ITA re-affirmed the countervailability of one of the programs, but at a
lower subsidy level; the ITA did not reaffirm the countervailability in the other program for
lack of substantial evidence. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Binational
Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1991 WL 143863 (Apr. 11, 1991). The outcome is moot in light
of the ITC's negative determination of threat of material injury discussed below.
127. On remand, the ITA affirmed the countervailability of these five subsidy programs
and provided additional information to substantiate their findings. The Panel then affirmed
two programs and again remanded the remaining four. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork
from Canada, 12 ITRD 2299, 2319-25 (Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, Sept. 28,
1990). The outcome is moot in light of the ITC's negative determination of threat of
material injury, discussed below.
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and that actual Canadian produc-

tion had increased only 8.4 % during the period in question. Panelists noted that this misinformation may have colored the ITC's
assessment of other issues. Likewise, evidence of a slight decline
in U.S. pork consumption had been based on per capita data and
thus failed to account for U.S. population growth. The Panel also
pointed that Canadian pork sales to Japan had been increasing "by
rather striking proportions," with the exception of April 1989, the
month considered by ITC counsel. 1 29 Lastly, the assumption that
hog production would rise sharply in response to subsidy programs

was also unsubstantiated. Thus, the case was remanded to the
ITC.
On second remand the ITC affirmed its previous finding of
threat of injury, arguing that Canadian subsidy programs tend to

shift negative effects of hog cycles to the U.S. market. 130 The Binational Panel again remanded the case, stating that the ITC had
made a legal error in reopening the record to new information
and issues without affording notice to interested parties.' 3 ' Upon
its third consideration, the ITC reached a negative determination
1 32
of threat of injury.

An examination of the outcomes of the Red Raspberries and
Chilled Pork cases suggests that the Chapter 19 provisions of the
CUSFTA represent a significant improvement in resolving trade

disputes. While abiding by existing national laws, the Binational
Panel mechanism appears to have reduced protectionism by offer-

ing a more balanced interpretation of law and more careful economic reasoning and data evaluation. 133 The timeliness of Panel
128. The error arose due to a change in the method of reporting pork production by
Agriculture Canada and Statistics Canada between 1987 and 1988. The error was identified
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 12
ITRD 2119, 2125 (Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-1 1, Aug. 24, 1990).
129. Id. at 2128. "In the Panel's view, such data appears to be so contrary to the
Record as a whole that it amounts to reliance on 'isolated tidbits' which does not meet the
'substantial evidence' standard of review." Id.
130. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 ITRD 1024, 1042-43 (USITC Inv.
No. 701-TA-298, Oct. 1990).
131. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 ITRD 1291, 1297, 1303
(Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-1 1, Jan. 22, 1991).
132. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork of Canada, 13 ITRD 1453, 1465 (USITC Inv. No.
701-TA-298, Feb. 1991).
133. Other authors commenting favorably on the CUSFrA DSM include: Parker,
supra note 38, at 92-93; Rugman, supra note 116, at 334; Rugman & Anderson, supra note
117, at 42. The Panel decision remanding the ITC decision in the Chilled Pork case was
affirmed by an Extraordinary (CUSFTA) Panel review which was invoked by the U.S.
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 ITRD 1859, 1866 (Extraordinary Challenge
Committee, June 14, 1991).
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decisions is also an important step toward freer trade, since legal
costs and shipping delays are themselves trade impediments.
B.

THE COMING DEMISE OF CHAPTER

19?

Given the positive features of Chapter 19 as an impartial
DSM, it is unfortunate that the U.S. is now retreating from its support for such a forum. It appears that the U.S. is returning to its
traditional preference for a power-oriented negotiation model.
The Dallas Composite reveals that Mexico argued for a continuation of the CUSFTA concept of a separate Chapter (eleven) for
AD/CVD disputes."' The U.S. rejected this position and moreover insisted that all disputes arising under the CUSFA and the
NAF'A be settled under the NAFTA "unless both Parties agree
otherwise. 135 Canada proposed that disputes arising under either
agreement "may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the
1' 6
complaining party.' 1
Clearly, the U.S. Administration regards Chapter 19 as a bad
idea. They are seeking to avoid its application in the CUSFTA
(through the NAFTA) while opposing the inclusion of a similar
provision in the NAFTA. Given these positions, it is predictable
that the U.S. will not agree to extend Chapter 19 beyond its January 1, 1996 expiration date. The DSM of the NAFTA seems destined to be little more than an agreement to negotiate disputes as
they arise, rather than a mechanism to resolve controversies
through submission to a neutral forum (unless the parties explicitly
agree, on an ad hoc basis, to submit the matter to binding
37
arbitration).,
C.

IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA FOR US-MEXICO
AD DISPUTES IN AGRICULTURE

CVD AND

While there have been many U.S.-Mexican disputes over
dumping and subsidization in recent years, relatively few have
involved agricultural products.' 3 8 This is in marked contrast to the
134. Dallas Composite, supra note 14, art. 2308. On February 28, 1992, Mr. Jaime
Serra Puche, The Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development, informed
the Commerce Committee of the Mexican Senate as follows: "Also, is being considered the
establishment of an expert panel, with participation from the three countries that would
determine in case of controversies if AD/CVD procedures were appropriately applied."
Avances en la Negociaci6n del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Mixico, Canadd y Estados
Unidos [Progress in the Negotiation of the NAFTA], III MONOGRAPH OF SECOFI
[Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development].
135. Id. art. 2310.
136. Id.
137. Id. art 2313.
138. Of 23 CVD cases brought by the U.S. against Mexico from 1979-87 under the 1979

1992]

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:

NAFTA & AGRICULTURE

593

U.S.-Canadian experience, where agriculture has been a major

subject of AD and CVD disputes. The scarcity of unfair trade cases
between U.S. and Mexican agricultural interests likely reflects the
existence of significant duties and quantitative restrictions that

have tended to reduce or eliminate cross-border cost advantages
in production. Thus, there is the possibility that a NAFTA agree-

ment may result in increased CVD and AD cases due to tariff and
quota reductions. The absence of an effective DSM for these predictable disputes does not augur well for the future of the NAFTA.
IV. MEXICO AND THE NAFTA'S DSM
The DSM of the GATT and of the CUSFTA are the most relevant models for the NAFA negotiators. It is probable that some
combination of binding and nonbinding trinational or binational
arbitration panels will be used. Whether membership in the ad
hoe panels contemplated by the NAFTA Dallas Composite would
be limited to the disputants was not resolved.1 9 A discussion of

some of the more salient matters to be resolved in the NAFTA
negotiation follows.
A.

POWER-ORIENTED OR RULE-ORIENTED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

CUSFTA's Chapters 18 and 19 present striking contrasts. The
Trade Agreements Act, only two involved agricultural goods. See Fresh Asparagus from
Mexico, 5 ITRD 1373 (Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, May
13, 1983); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Mexico, 6 ITRD 1757 (Department of
Commerce International Trade Administration, April 16, 1984). Both determinations were
negative, as subsidies received by growers were found to be generally available domestic
subsidies and thus not countervailable. See Smith, supra note 7. Of 15 AD cases against
Mexico reported by Powell, Giesse and Jackson, again only two involved agricultural
products. See Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables-Mexico, 11 ITRD 5339 (Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, March 28, 1990); Certain Fresh Cut
Flowers from Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Kenya, Mexico,
Netherlands and Peru, 6 ITRD 1757 (USITC Inv. No. 303-TA-18, 701-TA-275 to 278, and
731-TA-327 to 333, Aug. 1988). Of these, Winter Vegetables was decided in favor of
Mexico, while dumping was affirmed in the case of Fresh Flowers. Certain Fresh Winter
Vegetables--Mexico, 11 ITRD 5339 (Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, March 28, 1990); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands and Peru, 6 ITRD 1757
(USITC Inv. No. 303-TA-18, 701-TA-275 to 278, and 731-TA-327 to 333, Aug. 1988). See
Stephen J. Powell et al., CurrentAdministration of US. Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws: Implicationsfor Prospective US.-Mexico Free Trade Talks, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
B. 177, 179 n.10 (1990).
In an empirical study of the country incidence of total U.S. AD and CVD cases from
1975 through 1979, Finger reported that cases brought against Canada included goods with
a total value of $421.7 million, with affirmative cases equalling 4.7% by value. Cases
brought against Mexico included imports valued at $202.3 million, with 0.6% by value
being affirmed. Finger, supra note 117, at 268.
139. Dallas Composite, supra note 14, arts. 2314-2315.
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institutional provisions (18) are broad and vague, leaving govern-

ment officials considerable flexibility to negotiate a consensual resolution. The AD/CVD provisions (19), however, are designed for
formal litigation with detailed procedural rules for panel adjudication and implementation of their decisions. The U.S., which can
rely on economic and political power, would be more inclined
toward negotiated solutions.1 40 Mexico, which needs stronger pro-

cedural protection, may be expected to argue for expanded jurisdiction of binding adjudication panels. 14 1 These positions could
merge in the creation of a more institutionalized DSM, with bind142
If
ing and nonbinding arbitration and an expanded secretariat.
trinational panels are used, they would probably be formed to
avoid a situation where only a minority of the panel would represent the countries whose laws are being interpreted. 143 A poweroriented or negotiation model would suggest having only the two

parties involved participate in the DSM. An adjudicatory model
would not view the DSM as another
form of negotiation but as
44
application of the rule to the facts.'

140. The U.S. preference for a negotiated solution to its trade disputes is well
illustrated by its reliance on threats (and occasional use) of unilateral trade reprisals for
unfair and unreasonable trade practices by its trading partners as authorized by "Section
301." See generally Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable"Foreign Trade
Practices The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 69 MINN. L. REV.
461 (1975). The "super" and "special" section 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1988)), demonstrate the current popularity of section 301, which has been widely
condemned by U.S. trading partners as violative of the multilateral DSM goals of the
Uruguay Round. The USTR has characterized its section 301 actions as in furtherance of
GATT goals. See Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 "*.Its Requirements,
Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 273 (1989-90).
141. Binding arbitration by expert ad hoc panels has traditionally been favored as a
DSM in international transactions. The International Chamber of Commerce and
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes provide conciliation and
arbitration services. Kevin C. Kennedy, InternationalCommercial ArbitrationLegislation
in the State of Michigan: A Proposal, DET. C. L. REV., Winter 1990, at 9. See UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (UNCITRAL) (adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, June 21, 1985) in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1302 (1985). The
U.S. and Israel have successfully completed their first binding arbitration under their FTA.
Middle East: ArbitrationPanel Says US. Violated Israel FTA in Attempt to Block Taiwan
Machine Tools, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1069 (July 17, 1991). Mexico and Chile recently
signed an FTA in which a binding arbitration DSM similar to the CUSFTA Chapter 19 was
adopted.
142. Referrals or specific disputes to binding or nonbinding arbitration could be
accomplished according to subject matter or on a selected basis. See, e.g., CUSFTA annex
705.4 (16), (17) (wheat subsidy level).
143. Each party could choose two panelists, and the fifth might be chosen from the
third country's roster. Victor Carlos Garcia Moreno & Cesar E. Hernandez,
Neoprotectionism and the Panels as a Defense Mechanism against Unfair Practices (El
Neoproteccionismo y los paneles como mecanismo de defensa contra las prActicas desleales)
(Dec. 11, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at the School of Law, Mexico's National
University, Mexico City).
144. Whether membership in the ad hoc panels contemplated by the NAIFTA Dallas

1992]
B.

DISPUTE SE'TLEMENT:

NAFTA & AGRICULTURE

595

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

Private individuals are not authorized to directly invoke
either the DSM of the GATT or the CUSFTA. But AD/CVD

reviews may be invoked by an individual through his government
in the CUSFTA. Mexico may press for a direct private right of
action, authorizing individuals to challenge government sanctions.

Such privatization of the DSM would be likely to expand the use
and transparency of the DSM.

Purely private sector disputes

14 5
could be handled under the auspices of a NAFTA DSM as well.

C.

DOES THE UNITED STATES CONTEMPLATE A "HUB AND
SPOKE" OR "DOCKING" ARRANGEMENT WITH
FUTURE LATIN AMERICAN FREE TRADE
PARTNERS?

On June 27, 1990 President Bush called for an "Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative" (EAI), with a "free trade zone stretching
from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego."'146 He stated
that the U.S. was ready to sign "framework agreements" with
Latin American and Caribbean countries for the purpose of identifying impediments to free trade and the means of removing

them.' 47 The threat that Mexico and Canada would enjoy excluspurred an enthusiastic
sive trade concessions with the U.S. has
4
response to the President's initiative. 1
Although agreements were quickly signed in 1990 by the U.S.
1 49
Colombia,15 0
and several Latin American countries (Bolivia,
Chile,15 ' Ecuador, 15 2 Honduras, 53 and Costa Rica' 5 4 ), it appears
Composite would be limited to the disputants was not resolved. See Dallas Composite,
supra note 14, arts. 2314, 2315.
145. Chairman E. (Kika) de la Garza, Press Release, Committee on Agriculture, U.S.
House of Representatives (Oct. 31, 1991) (proposals for settling U.S.-Mexico Trade
Disputes).
146. President Bush, Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Remarks before
administrative officials and members of the business community (June 27, 1990), in OFF. OF
PUB. COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Current Policy No. 1288, June 1990, at 1-2.
147. Id.
148. Sidney Weintraub, The New US Economic Initiative Toward Latin America, J.
INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFFAIRS 1, 1-3 (1991).
149. The agreements have typically established a "Joint Commission on Trade and
Investment Agreements" in which the U.S. and the country in question form a joint
commission to identify impediments and issues for subsequent negotiations. Latin America:
Bush Announces New Intiatives on Trade, Aid, and Debt Reduction for Latin America, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. 983 (BNA) (July 4, 1990); Latin America: Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Zone Possible Within This Decade, Bolivian Official Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1485
(Sept. 26, 1990).
150. Signed July 17, 1990. Latin America: Delegates to US.-Colombia Joint
Commission Pledge to Work Toward Liberalizing Trade, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1550
(Oct. 10, 1990).
151. Signed on Oct. 2, 1990. Latin America: US. and Chile Sign Framework
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that the U.S. prefers to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs)

with groups of nations who have achieved their own economic
integration. Regional trade pacts are being formed among the
Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia), 5 - Mercosur

(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uru-

guay),' 56 and the Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua).' 57
The Bush administration has not determined if its model for
extending free trade will be a "hub and spoke" system which envisions the U.S. having separate bilateral FTAs with various regional
FTAs, or a "docking arrangement" whereby countries would sign
on to a NAFTA (through an accession clause) potentially applicable

to all.' 58 Congress will undoubtedly insist that each FTA be separately negotiated. One trade expert has termed the complexities
and political difficulties
of a "hub and spoke" arrangement as
"nightmarish."'1 59 Canadians have argued that such agreements
would serve to perpetuate "bilateralism" or discriminatory trade
preference to the detriment of free trade objectives; namely, the
development of economies
of scale and comparative advantage
60
without trade distortion.1

Apart from these concerns, the use of a "hub and spoke" DSM
raises other problems. The U.S. is likely to push the case for bilatAgreement EstablishingTrade and Investment Council, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1513 (Oct.
3, 1990).
152. Signed July 23, 1990. Latin America: Administration Officials Urge Quick
Passage of ProposalFor Latin America Initiative, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1513 (Oct. 3,
1990).
153. Signed Nov. 1, 1990. Latin America: Honduras and US. sign Framework
Agreement on Investment, Trade Relations, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1707 (Nov. 7, 1990).
154. Signed Nov. 29, 1990. Latin America: US., Costa Rica Sign Framework
Agreement Establishing Trade and Investment Council, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1837
(Dec. 5, 1990).
155. The Andean Group Summit Unification Agreement took effect Jan. 1, 1991. Latin
America: Hopes for a HemisphericCommon Market Dominate Meetings of Latin American
Heads, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1859 (Dec. 18, 1991).
156. Mercosur was signed on March 26, 1991. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay,Uruguay Sign Agreement to Create Common Market by 1995, 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 482 (March 27, 1991). Mercosur signed a framework agreement with the U.S. on
June 19, 1991. Latin America: Bush and Brazilian President Collor Discuss Joint
Framework Agreement, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 929 (June 19, 1991).
157. A series of pacts among these countries were signed beginning August, 1991.
Latin America: Central American Countries Sign Accords in Preparationfor Trade Pact
with US., 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1621 (Nov. 6, 1991).
158. Latin America: How to Integrate Western Hemisphere FTAS Still Undecided, US.
Trade Official Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 512 (April 3, 1991). Former USTR, Bill Brock,
has endorsed the idea of having an accession clause in the NAFrA. International
Agreements: Former USTR Brock Endorses Idea of Accession Clause in NAFTA, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1012 (July 3, 1991).
159. Wientraub, supra note 148, at 3 & n.4.
160. RONALD J. WONNACOiT-, THE ECONOMICS OF OVERLAPPING FREE TRADE AREAS
AND THE MEXICAN CHALLENGE xiv (1991).
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eral negotiation DSMs, thereby giving it the advantage of its superior economic power. Such an arrangement seems likely to lead to
a patchwork DSM that would produce inconsistent (discriminatory) results and engender resentment and mistrust between the
regional miniblocks, while undermining the principal goal of
establishing a perception of fairness in the process. 16 1 This suggests the wisdom of having a multinational tribunal charged with
16 2
the responsibility of interpreting a single instrument.
D.

PERMANENT INSTITUTION OR AD

Hoc

PANELS?

The "hub and spoke" issue implicitly raises the question of the
pros and cons of having a permanent, prestigious and multilateral
DSM, rather than arbitration through binding or nonbinding ad
hoc panels. Ad hoc panels lack the advantage of the expertise that
would come with a permanent tribunal. The most compelling
model for such a tribunal is the EC's Court of Justice. While the
NAFTA is not a common market, nor a customs union (common
tariffs), nor an effort to achieve political integration, it is an effort
to establish a framework for economic integration. The role of the
Court of Justice in the evolution of the EC's common market is
well worth considering. The EC Court of Justice has thirteen
judges, assisted by six "Advocates General," one of whom recommends a decision to the court in each case. The judges are
appointed by agreement of the members for renewable six-year
terms. "Although there is no requirement that there should be at
least one judge from each member state, this is and has always
been the practice."' 6 3 The Court of Justice has the power to annul
national acts that conflict with community law, along the lines of
the United States Supreme Court,' 6 4 although such authority does
not exist in the judiciary in many of the member states. Moreover,
161. While the parties have agreed that the copies of requests for consultation shall be
provided to "third" or "other" parties the U.S. objected to joint consultations unless "all the
parties" agree. Dallas composite, supra note 14, art. 2311(1),(3).
162. A permanent tribunal would solve the practical difficulties of providing a
sufficient supply of panelists.
Professor Hudec has observed that it is difficult to find expert panelists who do not fall
into one of two categories-lawyers who have had previous relationship with the litigants or
persons without apparent conflicts, but whose expertise is questionable. Hudec, Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, Comments, in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, supra note 27, at 87-89.
163. FRANCIS G. JACOBS AND ANDREW DURAND, REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN

COURT: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 173 (1975).

164. The Court of Justice has defined the scope of community power over EC
commerce while restraining national power to affect such commerce in a manner very
parallel to the United States Supreme Court with respect to the Commerce Clause, the
Congress and the states. See 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 11 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric
Stein eds., 1982).
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the Court of Justice's case law has precedental value, again more

akin to a common law system than the civil law tradition of all EC
members except the United Kingdom. The Court of Justice has
played an enormous role in the EC's success in achieving economic integration. 1 65 This is particularly true with respect to agriculture, where the Court has enforced the EC's Common
Agricultural Plan and agricultural organization by invalidating
66
inconsistent member states' legislation.'

A more familiar model for a NAFTA permanent DSM institution would be the Canada-United States International Joint Commission 6 ' or the Mexico-United States International Boundary

and Water Commission,' 68 which deal with boundary and water
problems. These commissions have some authority to resolve disputes. They also have a permanent staff that appoints necessary
experts who are authorized to issue nonbinding recommendations
and prepare reports, regarding disputes, for the two governments.

The DSM of the NAFTA that is contemplated in the Dallas
Composite has little institutional substance. The "Commission" is
simply a name given to a consultation process involving cabinet
level trade ministers or their delegates. 6 9 The "Secretariat" com170
templates a national staff, not a multilateral professional group.

E. DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS
It is often stated that a DSM between Mexico (with a civil law
system) and the U.S. and Canada (with a common law system)
165. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 201-02.
166. The Court of Justice has held that the common organization of the EC's
agriculture policy may be regarded as forming a complete system precluding the resort to
national

law.

J.A.

USHER,

LEGAL

ASPECTS

OF AGRICULTURE

IN THE

EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY 125 (1988) (citing Koenecke, 1984 E.C.R. 3291). The Court of Justice has
scrutinized member state legislation for its conformity with the common organization's
express provisions and the compatibility of such legislation with the aims and objectives of
the EC's common organization. Id. at 130 (citing Apple and Pear Development Council,
1983 E.C.R. 4083). The Court of Justice has approved legislation, adopted by a majority
vote, prohibiting the use of substances causing certain hormonal reactions in livestock. Id.
at 21 (citing United Kingdom v. Commission, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1988)). It has also struck a
German prohibition of liqueurs with an alcohol strength of less than 25%. Id. at 28 (citing
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 CMLR 494 (1979)).
167. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters, and Questions Arising between th United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat.
2448, TS 551, 12 Bevans 319, (reprinted in L.M. BLOOMFIELD AND GERALD F.
FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 206
(1958).
168. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219 (1947).
169. Dallas Composite, supra note 14, art. 2301.
170. Id. art. 2302. However, no GATT instrument has explicitly established anything
approaching its Secretariat; rather, the experience of the GATT process and tradition has
created it.
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poses particularly difficult problems. The relative lack of independence of the Mexican judiciary is also cited. 17 1 These concerns

should be analyzed in the context of what the NAFTA purports to
be, namely a trade agreement. The parties have adopted common
international trade instruments. All three countries have signed

the GA'TT Antidumping Code and have implemented it through
their own internal legislation. 172 The U.S. and Canada have signed
the GAT Subsidies Code, while Mexico has signed an equivalent
agreement with the U.S.. 1 73 All three countries have legislation
implementing GATT' provisions authorizing imposition of CVDs to
offset "subsidies."'1 7 4 Although there are other significant differences in the internal trade law of the three countries, similar discrepancies have not proven to be a problem for the CUSFTA
panels.

175

However, differences between the countries in the scope and
rigor of judicial review may prove more difficult. 1 76 For example
it has been observed that binational panel review is more valuable
to Canadian than to American exporters, because the standard 1of
77
U.S. judicial review is more rigorous in the U.S. than in Canada.
171. InternationalAgreements: US.-Canada Dispute Settlement Mechanism Must Be
Broaderfor NAFTA, Expert Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1544 (Oct. 23, 1991).
172. Canada did so through the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), R.S.C., ch. S-15
(1985XCan.); the United States through the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 (TAA), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1673-73i, 1675, 1677-77h (1988); Mexico through the MEX. CONST. art. 131 (Ley de
Comercio Exterior or L.C.E., published in the DiarioOficial of the Federation, January 13,
1986)). See generally Sistema Mexicano de Defensa Contra Practicas Desleales de comercio
International (SECOFI) [Mexican System of Defense Against Unfair Trade Practices
(Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development)].
173. Mexico has not signed the Subsidies Code but has signed an equivalent
Understandingregardingsubsidies and countervailingduties, April 23, 1985, U.S.-Mexico,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1986, at 94.

174. The U.S. CVD statutes are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-71f, 1675, 1677, 1677c77h (1988).
175. In the U.S., is there a private right of action in that the complainant may seek
judicial review of the administrative authority's refusal to proceed with their petition.
Lermer, supra note 6, at 34; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1988). Conversely, private
petitioners must represent a majority of producers of like goods in the importing country to
have standing in Canada and the U.S. Rugman & Porteous, supra note 12, at 71. But, only
25% of such producers are required to petition to proceed with the investigation in Mexico.
Sistema Mexicano de Defensa Contra Practicas Desleales de Comercio Internacional, art.
10 L.C.E. regulation arts. 13, 14 (Mex.).
Both Canada and Mexico have provisions in the law which authorize the administrative
authority to take the public interest into consideration in the imposition of ADs or CVDs.
Special Imports Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15, § 45 (1985) (Can.); Sistema Mexicano de
Defensa Contra Practicas Desleales de Comercio Internacional, L.C.E., regulation arts. 1,
4.6, 13 (Mex.). In Canada, such a review process in the Grain Corn case resulted in an
immediate reduction in the CVD on U.S. corn imports. Rugman & Porteous, supra note 12,
at 78. See also Rugman & Anderson, supra note 117, at 7-12.
176. This was a particularly contentious issue between the ITC and the Panel in Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 ITRD 1291 (USA-89-1904-1 1, Jan. 22, 1991).
177. Ferguson, supra note 12, at 349; Lermer, supra note 6, at 40. Canadian exporters
have successfully utilized Chapter 19 more often than U.S. exporters to date. See supra
note 10.
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Mexico's tradition of judicial review is perceived as even less
78
favorable to exporters.'
In the U.S., exporters or the petitioners who are dissatisfied
with administrative rulings in AD/CVD cases may seek judicial

review in the federal courts. The standard of review is one of
"'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,' 'unsupported

by substantial evidence on the record,' or 'otherwise not in accordance with law.' "179 In Canada, the standard of review under the
Federal Court Act is either a failure to "observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond, or refused to exercise, its
jurisdiction,' ''error in law," or as basing a decision on "erroneous
"8....
01 It
finding of fact ... in a perverse or capricious manner
appears that a greater percentage of administrative trade deci-

sions have been reversed in the U.S. than in Canada.' 8 '
In Mexico administrative review of AD/CVD appears is limited to Mexican importers.'8 2 But the Mexican importer, as well as
the local petitioner, may seek judicial review of a final AD/CVD
administrative ruling from the Federal Tax Tribunal in the federal
district court via indirect amparo.18 3 The petitioner could chal178. InternationalAgreements: US-Canada Dispute Settlement Mechanism Must Be
Broaderfor NAFTA, Expert Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 1544 (Oct. 23, 1991).
179. Horlick et al., supra note 27, at 68 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(bXl)); Donald P.
Cluchey, Dispute Resolution Provisionsof the Canada-UnitedStates Free TradeAgreement,
40 ME. L. REV. 335, 347 n.97 (1988). Nonetheless, U.S. courts accord considerable
deference to administrative agencies because of their administrative expertise. The United
States Supreme Court has held that "substantial evidence" is "more than a mere scintilla of
evidence" but less than 51% of the evidence. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938). It may be assumed that a binational panel of experts would not be as
deferential to an administrative agency, given their comparable technical competence.
Roberto E. Berry, Normas de Revision en Materia de Antidumping y tarifas Compensatorias
en el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Mexico y Canada [Standards of
Review in AD/CVD in the NAFTA] (Nov. 7-9, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, presented at
the Private International Law Academy of Mexico, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico). The
Chilled Pork case illustrates the unwillingness of the Panel to accord such deference to an
agency whose error is apparent. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork, 12 ITRD 2299, 2304
(Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, Sept. 28, 1990).
180. Horlick et al., supra note 27, at 68-69, 78-79 & n.21 (citing certain case law for
these propositions, noting that "where a tribunal properly admits evidence, it cannot be
reversed for giving the wrong weight to particular evidence.").
181. Id. at 72. See also John Kazanjian, Dispute Settlement Procedures in Canadian
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE: THE
CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 197, 198, 201 (Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown
eds., 1988). The author, a Canadian trade lawyer, argues that the Canadian "Federal Court
will generally defer" to administrative trade authorities. Id. at 198. He also argues that it is
likely that "both the U.S. and Canadian panel members would take their own expertise into
account and could be less deferential than the Federal Court to the expertise of the trade
regulators." Id. at 201.
182. One of the coauthors was informed by SECOFI officials that exporters had
unsuccessfully attempted to challenge AD orders by a writ of amparo (judicial review)
which was rejected by the circuit courts on two separate occasions.
183. Articles 14 and 16 of the Mexican Constitution prescribe the requirements of
procedural due process, or conformity with previous existing law, and constitutional
"competence" (jurisdiction and authority of the official). RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL
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lenge the constitutionality of the ruling on the grounds of conformity with previously existing law, its legal justification or the
"legal competency" (authority and jurisdiction) of the public offi-

cial in question.'1 4 Mexican courts may also examine whether the
responsible authority's discretional power was properly
employed.' 8 5 Researchers have found Mexican judicial review of
administrative decisions to be comparably rigorous to U.S. judicial

review.' 86 However the substitution of a binational panel's
review for judicial review may raise constitutional problems in
87
Mexico. 1
F.

IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL DIFFERENCES

The problems of integrating a common and civil law legal system have been managed in the EC by the creation of a common
charter (Treaty of Rome) and a single tribunal to interpret it.'
The CUSFTA attempts to have it both ways in that a common FIA
governs the Commission's negotiations, but each importing party's

internal laws are to be applied in AD/CVD cases.' 8 9 While the
intrinsic fairness of judicial review in each country may be compa-

rable, the importance of the differences in legal culture cannot be
REVIEW IN MExIco: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 121-123 (1971); see generally Hector

Fix Zamudio, A BriefIntroduction to the Mexican Writ ofAmparo, 9 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.R.
306 (1979).
There is also a right of appeal to the Mexican Collegiate Circuit Court or Supreme
Court. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA 131 (1975).

184. Articles 103 and 107 of the Mexican Constitution and the Law of Amparo (Ley de
Amparo) set forth the substantive and procedural requirements for the "amparo," a unique
constitutional writ of mandate and prohibition in Mexican law.
185. Baker, supra note 183, at 240.
186. Mexican Writ of Amparo is widely used in Mexico. Researchers have reported
that its effectiveness is comparable with the U.S. in terms of reversal of administrative
rulings and that judicial review in Mexico compares favorably with other Latin American
countries. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN AND DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN
EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 339-340, 778-784 (1978).

187. Articles 103, 104 and 107 of Mexico's Constitution establish judicial review of
violations of "individual guarantees" in the federal courts. Dr. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Toward
a Free Trade Agreement (Hacia el Tratado de Libre Comercio) BOLETIN JURIDICO DE
ANALISIS LEGISLATIVO DEL CONSEJO COORDINADOR EMPRESARIAL, Aug. 1991, at 39, 53-

54 (Aug., 1991).
188. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 199-202.
189. However, CUSFTA panels have been willing to directly apply GAT'T and
CUSFTA law in AD/CVD cases. In Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment from Canada, 12 ITRD 1461 (U.S.A. 90-1904-1, March 7, 1990), the
Panel noted that, "whenever possible, the Tariff Act [U.S. Trade Law] should be construed
in a manner consistent with the GATr.- Id. at 1467. In the Chilled Pork case, the
Binational Panel found a violation of CUSFTA principles of fairness with respect to a partial
reopening of the record on remand despite objections by the U.S. petitioners that the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution, supported their position. Fresh Chilled and Frozen
Pork from Canada, 13 ITRD 1291, 1298 (Binational Panel No. USA-89-1904-1 1, Jan. 22,
1991).

602

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:567

denied. 190 For example, the nature of the relationship between
national law and international law may vary significantly. The U.S.
Congress may approve legislation contrary to binding international agreements, 1 91 and if the measure becomes law, it would be
binding on the U.S. courts, although they would seek to construe
the two so as to avoid conflict.1 9 2 The same analysis would apply in
193
Canada.

Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution, like the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, equates treaties with federal statutes, so long as they conform to the Constitution.1 9' While
U.S. and Canadian jurists would appear to agree that their countries could, if they chose, enact legislation contrary to the NAFTA
which would be binding on their national courts, Mexican jurists
have a different perspective. 195 Mexico's legal tradition and polit190. See William J. Bridge, Lionel Pereznieto Castro, and James F. Smith, A Different
Legal System, in 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, ch. 3, 8-14 (Michael W. Gordon ed., 1992).
191. Because the Congress has never explicitly implemented the GATT itself,
questions have been raised about its status under U.S. law. It does appear that the
President's authority to obligate the U.S. to the GATT was authorized by the 1945 renewal
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1945. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 145, 306-07.
More importantly, Congress has implicitly approved the GATT' through decades of
acquiescence to it without any rejection of its provisions. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (adopting an expansive acquiescence doctrine in approving the executive's
suspension of U.S. litigation against Iran during the hostage crisis). However, this analysis
does not hold for Part IV of the GATT, which was not authorized and for which the record
of acquiescence is questionable.
192. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which implements the Tokyo Round
Antidumping Code Subsidies Code, explicitly states that no such agreement "which is in
conflict with any statute of the U.S. shall be given effect .... Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, sec. 3(a). Similarly, the CUSTA Implementation Act of
1988 specifically provides that no provision in the agreement "which is in conflict with any
law of the United States shall have effect." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 41, at 545 (Supp.
1989) (citing United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988). Congressional executive agreements, which are
first authorized by Congress and then subsequently implemented by legislation by
Congress, stand on equal footing to treaties. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882); B.
Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 587 (1912). When a treaty or congressional
executive agreement and a federal law "relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating
the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control."
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). The Latin maxim leyes posteriorespriores
contrariesabrogant("the last expression of the sovereign will must control") aptly states the
principle. The Congress may amend its trade laws as it chooses, as a matter of internal law,
despite whatever international law violations may be implied. Moser v. United States, 341
U.S. 41 (1951); Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829). See generally Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 163, 221-222, 407 (1972).
193. JACOMY-MILLETrE, TREATY LAW IN CANADA 282-290 (1975).

194. Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution is very similar to the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution.
195. Mexican jurists consider treaties as "special enactments" which prevail over
"general legislative laws." While the Congress can modify law, it may not abrogate treaties.
Treaties and statutes are seen as two distinct sources of normativity. Accordingly, the U.S.Canadian doctrine that a treaty and federal law are of equivalent hierarchy, and that the
latest in time ("ley posterior") governs, does not apply. Fernando Alejandro Vazquez
Pando, Jerarquiadel tratado de libre comercio entre Mexico, Estados Unidos de America y
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ical philosophy are more deferential to international law. 1 96 The
matter is of some political significance in that Mexicans may see
themselves at a distinct disadvantage in this regard.' 97
Case law is of far more importance in the U.S. and Canada
than in Mexico. Such fundamental differences in legal tradition as
methodology in legal research and analysis would undoubtedly
prove problematic for a U.S. or Canadian panelist required to
determine and apply Mexican law, or vice-versa. Again this suggests the need for a permanent tribunal or secretariat, so that such
trinational expertise could be institutionalized, whether ad hoc
panels are used or not.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fundamental agricultural trade issues, such as subsidies, will
not be resolved by the NAFTA, at least as long as the Uruguay
Canada en el sistema juridico Mexicano ("Hierarchy of the NAFTA in the Mexican legal
system") PANORAMA JURIDICO DEL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO, UNIVERSIDAD IBERO
AMERICANA DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO, MEXICO 35, 41 (1992); Mexican law is not well

settled on this point because the Mexican Supreme Court has not published binding
precedent (jurisprudencia definida) on this issue. Such binding precedent may be
elaborated by the Supreme Court en banc, the Supreme Court chambers or collegiate
circuit courts, when such a court makes the same ruling on a certain point of law in five
consecutive decisions (without contrary ruling in between the first and the fifth decision).
Lower federal courts and administrative courts would be bound by jurisprudencia from
higher courts. See Art. 107 of the Constitution, articles 94, 192, 193, and 197 of the Amparo
Law, and article 95 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the Federation should be
viewed for reference.
196. Article 89, Section X of the Constitution of the United Mexican States reflects the
Mexican philosophy in stating that, in conducting foreign policy, the "[e]xecutive [p]ower
shall observe the normative principle... [of] the legal equality of states." MEX. CONST. art.
89, § X. Dr. Cesar Sepulveda, a celebrated Mexican jurist in the field of public international
law, has written:
The examination of the Mexican practice reveals that no norm has existed
that attempts to limit compliance with an international treaty, nor have the
courts established binding precedent, in any case, to place the Constitution over
treaties. Also, it is certain that the Mexican nation has complied in good faith
with all of its obligations derived from the international legal order, despite its
effect on its internal interests. The logical consequence is that in general
international law is superior to the norms of the Mexican state.
Cesar Sepulveda, Derecho Internacional79 (1986) (translated from Spanish to English by
author).
197. Mexico and Canada have both signed and ratified the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, done at Vienna on May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 63 A.J.I.L. 875
(1969) (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980). It further provides that "a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,"
unless "that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of... fundamental importance."
Id. arts. 27, 46.1. The U.S. has signed but not ratified the Convention. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on May 23, 1969, S. TREATY DOC. No. 92-1, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). While the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it accepts the
same doctrine (Pactasunt servanda). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 321 (1987). But this international law principle does not necessarily determine how a
national court would construe a domestic law provision that conflicts with a prior treaty.
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Round has failed to settle them. Other more technical issues
which may be addressed such as phytosanitary regulations, tariffication, tariff reduction (together with the snapback provision) and
modest subsidy reduction, will probably be addressed by the
NAFTA and will be subject to interpretation and dispute resolution. A DSM mechanism that combines the binding and nonbinding arbitration features of CUSFTA Chapter 18 will most likely
function as well as it has in the CUSFTA. The presence of a permanent secretariat with professional staff, like the GATT Secretariat, would provide institutional continuity to the panel decision
and significantly enhance the efficacy of such a DSM.
The more contentious and important AD/CVD issues could
be adequately addressed, as it was in CUSFTA's Chapter 19, by
trinational or binational panels whose decisions are binding on the
national administrative agencies and courts. If the U.S. refuses to
agree to a Chapter 19-type DSM for AD/CVD disputes, such differences may pose a significant threat to the NAFTA's viability.
The addition of such politically volatile areas as environmental and
labor protection in a trade DSM would be problematic in that
clear substantive rules are not likely to be in place. Given the positions that the U.S. has advanced in the Dallas Composite, it
appears that the NAFTA DSM will remain in the political/negotiation realm of dispute resolution.' 98 The more fundamental issue of whether the NAFTA DSM can be designed to give
a permanent tribunal the jurisdiction to truly accelerate the process of hemispheric integration seems beyond the range of political possibility at this time.
The U.S. position on an international trade DSM is not limited
to a power-oriented negotiation model. The U.S. is likely to agree
to the GATT DSM reforms set forth in the Dunkel Text' 99 which,
if adopted, would dramatically move the GATT DSM toward a
rule adjudication model. Yet, the U.S. appears to be insisting on a
DSM negotiation model for the NAFTA. The rationale would
appear to be the relative power position of the U.S. in each
instance. The U.S. does not enjoy the same dominant relationship
with the EC and Japan that it does with Mexico and Canada. The
submission of controversies to rule application is more appropriate
with the former trading partners but tactically disadvantageous
with the latter. While the downside of this purely political equation suggests a stunted beginning for the NAFTA's DSM, any other
198. See supra part Ill(b).
199. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

1992]

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:

NAFTA & AGRICULTURE

605

result is unlikely, given the relatively intense politicization of the
NAFTA debate in the U.S. These developments underscore the
importance of the Uruguay Round in general and the DSM of the
GATT in particular.

